

Economic Development and Political Human Rights in East Asia

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Introduction

East Asia is regarded as the fastest growing region in terms of economy. Since the 1970s, leaders of East Asian countries have succeeded in achieving economic development by exporting manufactured goods and attracting foreign investment. For example, in the 1960s, South Korea's GDP per capita was about five hundred dollars. Now, it is about sixteen thousand dollars, which is seven times as much as India. In the 1990s, China recorded over ten percent growth rate. As a result, East Asian rulers succeeded in improving the living standard of their people. On the other hand, they did not allow their people to possess political human rights. Leaders argued that these rights, such as freedom of expression and assembly, would prevent them from mobilizing their people for economic development. Instead, Asian rulers promised that they would carry out democratic reforms after achieving economic growth.

However, many political leaders in East Asia did not fulfill their promise. Instead, they attempted to perpetuate their monopoly on power by oppressing the demands of various interest groups. However, in some countries, this attempt ended in a failure. In 1987, South Koreans succeeded in foiling the attempt of a military dictator to prolong his tenure of office. Civil society in Taiwan contributed to attenuating the impregnable power of the long-lasting Kuomintang government (Chan 180). On the other hand, in other Asian countries, economic development did not produce democracy. In Singapore, Malaysia, and China, authoritarian leaders who contributed to economic

growth still retain their monopoly on power. Meanwhile, Western countries and human rights groups criticize these rulers for denying political human rights. This phenomenon motivates me to answer the question, “Why do some East Asian countries which have achieved economic development withhold political human rights more than others?” I hypothesize that the more foreign investment in a country, the smaller the economic inequality in a country, the less the urbanization process in a country, the more leaders in a country withhold political human rights.

Significance of the Question

Western political scientists have advocated the modernization theory that emphasizes the positive relationship between economic development and democracy. In other words, they expect that economic development will bring about democracy in Third World countries. Since the late-1980s, the wave of democratization has spread into East Asian countries. In South Korea and Taiwan, ordinary people, who reaped benefits from economic growth, foiled the attempt of authoritarian leaders to perpetuate their monopoly on power. On the other hand, in China and Malaysia, dictatorial rulers who led economic development have succeeded in retaining power by withholding the political rights of ordinary people. This situation makes the modernization theory questionable. In other words, my research question encourages Western political scientists to reconsider the relationship between economic development and democracy.

Meanwhile, experts in East Asia have been interested in my research question. While witnessing the political situation in this region, they have tried to expound the Asian context of the relationship between economic development and democracy. Some

political scientists have placed an emphasis on the Confucian tradition, which is prevalent in East Asian countries. In other words, they have insisted that Asian values, which emphasize people's obedience to a higher authority and sacrifice for groups, prevent countries such as China and Singapore from adopting democracy. Other experts have contended that the democratization process relies on whether the local bourgeoisie or the middle class is influential or not. In addition, another scholars have argued that authoritarian leaders have succeeded in maintaining their power by forging an alliance with business elites and high-ranking military officers. As a result, my research question encourages experts in East Asia to explicate why the modernization theory does not fit some East Asian countries.

Since countries in East Asia achieved marvelous economic growth, policy makers in the United States and European countries have regarded this region as an important place for the global economy. They have increased their engagement in trade with East Asia. Many multinational companies have invested their money in lucrative industries in this region. On the other hand, policy makers in Western countries have been dismayed by human rights violations in some East Asian countries. They have urged these countries to rectify human rights conditions. In response to that, Asian leaders have urged Western officials to refrain from interfering in their internal affairs by arguing that Asian values are unfit to the Western-style democracy. My research question will help Western policy makers not only understand the political situation in East Asia but also carry out proper policies toward this region.

Literature Review

Seymour Lipset advocates the modernization theory by expounding the relationship between economic development and political human rights. He asserts that as poor countries achieve higher levels of economic development, political leaders in these countries tend to adopt the democratic policy that offers political rights to their people (Lipset 64-66). He emphasizes the positive relationship between economic development and political rights. Leaders in a country want to perpetuate their monopoly on political and economic power. However, their lust for power faces severe resistance from ordinary people who feel alienated. In order to retain political and economic power, political elites have no choice but to minimize this resistance.

On the one hand, they dedicate themselves to achieving economic development that alleviates people's negative attitude toward them. Political leaders motivate their people to engage arduously in productive activities. Meanwhile, these elites carry out various policies that bring economic prosperity to them. For example, leaders in a country encourage the exportation of manufactured goods while attracting foreign direct investment. On the other hand, authoritarian leaders restrain political rights of ordinary people to further economic development. These rulers argue that guaranteeing these rights not only hampers economic development but also plunges their country into chaos (Donnelly 620).

Economic growth generates improved education and the growth of a substantial middle class (Kim 1127). The richer people are, the more they have the opportunity to get a higher education. Through education, people can learn more about politics and governmental policies. Therefore, educated people cannot be deceived easily by the government's propaganda. Instead, they not only monitor the misbehaviors of their

leaders but they also urge them to rectify these wrongdoings. Economic development, which is accelerated by industrialization, brings about the diversification of the economy. Economic growth generates a new, much more diverse, complex, and interrelated economy (Huntington 65). This situation promotes class diversification, which then facilitates the rapid emergence of a middle class. Various organizations that belong to this class want to maximize their own interests. Therefore, they begin to aggregate and to organize their interests. When these groups feel that their government does not meet their demands, they urge it to accommodate their interests (Arat 36-37).

Meanwhile, various organizations of a middle class represent different interests. When one group's interests clash with those of others, these organizations compete against each other in order to achieve their goals. In this situation, leaders of the government come to realize that they cannot deal with the demands of various groups without the democratic process. In other words, the democratic system, which is predicated on compromise and tolerance, enables political leaders to arrange the various demands of interest groups (Clark 181-182). As a result, leaders of authoritarian regimes decide to carry out the democratization process.

Samuel Huntington agrees with the basic notion of the modernization theory (Arat 34). Economic development generates the transformation of social structure and values in a society. Increased economic prosperity within a society makes it possible for ordinary people to acquire a higher level of education. The easier access to education enables them to develop feelings of trust, life satisfaction, and competence, which lay the foundation for democratic institutions (Huntington 65).

Economic development also makes resources available for various social groups (Huntington 66). These organizations not only compete against each other but also reach compromises over the distribution of their resources. The process of competition and compromise familiarizes people with the values of democracy (Clark 167). Finally, economic development encourages a country to open its doors to foreign trade, investment, technology, tourism, and communications (Huntington 66). Integration of a country into the global economy not only helps non-governmental organizations acquire sources of wealth and influence, but also makes them disseminate the democratic ideas prevailing in developed countries.

However, Huntington insists that economic development does not necessarily lead to democratization (Kim 1127). He places an emphasis on the power and influence of the local bourgeoisie, which plays a crucial role in the process of democratization (Arat 34). To him, the more powerful this class is, the more a country is democratized. Therefore, the failure of democratization in Third World countries that have achieved economic development can be attributed to the weakness of their local bourgeoisie.

In this context, Huntington regards multinational corporations as an impediment to a developing country's democratization (Arat 35). These corporations tend to focus only on maximizing their profits. In other words, their only concern is taking advantage of the lucrative markets of a developing country by selling their high-quality items. The attitude of foreign companies discourages local companies from acquiring advanced technology and manufacturing skills. Therefore, the local bourgeoisie class, who facilitates the process of democratization, cannot flourish. Multinational companies focus on the political stability of their host country because it secures the safety of their

economic activities. These corporations are very reluctant to promote the democratization process of Third World countries. They think that this process will rapidly change of the established system, which may endanger the pursuit of their economic interests. Therefore, multinational companies help authoritarian leaders retain political and economic power. The attitude of transnational corporations enables the authoritarian government to perpetuate its monopoly on power.

Larry Diamond's argument coincides with the modernization theory. However, he contends that the contagion effects have contributed to the democratization process in Third World countries (Diamond 49). The development of the mass media makes it easier for people in one country to witness the political situation in their neighboring countries. When people in one country compel their authoritarian government to accommodate the democratic system, civil society in neighboring countries become inspired and emboldened by this event (Diamond 49). Therefore, civil society leaders to achieve their interests urge their dictatorial government to implement the democratic reforms. On the other hand, authoritarian leaders feel threatened by the situation of the neighboring country that is democratized. While witnessing their dictatorial friends surrender to the people's desire for democracy, the dictators lose their confidence to monopolize power (Diamond 50).

Diamond also emphasizes the pressure from Western countries. Throughout history, these countries have assumed an ambivalent attitude toward the democratization process in developing countries (Diamond 51). When Western leaders thought that a democratic regime would help them achieve their interests, they urged authoritarian leaders in a country to relinquish their power. Western countries not only bolstered

dictatorial regimes, but also subverted popularly elected ones that appeared unfriendly to their geopolitical interests (Diamond 51). Since the mid-1980s, Western democratic countries have rectified their ambivalence. They have compelled authoritarian leaders to accelerate the democratization process by using diplomatic and economic pressures (Diamond 52). For example, the Reagan Administration urged the South Korean military dictator to accommodate the civil society's demands by issuing a statement that denounced the military regime and also threatened to curtail their economic aid to South Korea.

Guillermo O'Donnell argues against a positive relationship between economic development and democracy. His theory of bureaucratic authoritarianism stipulates that economic growth does not guarantee democratization (Kim 1126). First, he asserts that authoritarian regimes typically consist of two rival groups: hard-liners and soft-liners. The former believes that it is possible for them to monopolize their political and economic power by smashing the demands of civil society. The latter stresses the necessity of limited reforms and democracy. This will then consolidate the power base of the authoritarian regime (O'Donnell 16). These two groups tend to compete against each other for greater power and influence. In this situation, both groups commit themselves to achieving economic growth. By taking advantage of economic development, they want to garner political support from ordinary people. Economic growth accelerates the diversification of classes that possess different interests. Various groups of classes not only compete against each other but also urge their authoritarian regime to accommodate their interests. As the conflicts of classes become intensified, both hard-liners and soft-liners feel threatened by the rising influence of civil society (O'Donnell

23). However, they attempt to resolve this crisis by different measures. Soft-liners argue that the government should implement restricted reforms to pacify class tension through persuasion and negotiation. On the other hand, hard-liners contend that they should nip the bud of an emerging civil society, which will erode the power base of their regime (O'Donnell 24). To them, repressive measures are inevitable for minimizing the conflicts of classes. In order to reduce these conflicts, they forge an alliance with the military and big capitalists that prefer the status quo to social upheavals (Arat 38). This alliance enables hard-liners to purge soft-liners out of the political arena. As a result, hard-liners can maintain their firm grip on power by repressing the activated popular sectors such as student organizations and labor unions.

Lee Kuan Yew, former Singaporean prime minister, grapples with the relationship between economic development and political rights by depending upon the cultural factor. He emphasizes Asian values that are predicated on the Confucian tradition to explicate economic growth and democracy in East Asia (Zakaria 115). Basically, he argues that Asian values, which have been inculcated in people's minds for several thousands years, are incompatible with those of the Western world. In other words, Western-style democracy does not fit East Asian countries (Zakaria 116).

Asian values not only prioritize groups' interests over those of individuals, but also regard people's obedience to their authority as a virtue (Kim 1129). Lee contends that these values, which are connected with capitalism, contribute to the rapid economic growth in East Asian countries. The influence of Asian values makes it easier for authoritarian leaders to motivate their people to engage arduously in productive activities. Ordinary people, who have been socialized to comply with these values, actively

cooperate with their government over economic development, even though it requires them to sacrifice their interests.

Lee also insists that ordinary people whose living standards are ameliorated by economic development want to maintain the status quo because it guarantees the stability of their economic well-being (Roy 234). Economic growth reinforces their positive attitude toward Asian values. In other words, people not only comply with the rules of their leaders, but also sacrifice their political rights for economic stability. In this situation, it is obvious that authoritarian leaders do not need to pursue policies that facilitate the process of democratization.

Hypotheses

My first hypothesis is that the more a country attracts foreign direct investment, the more it withholds political rights. This hypothesis is related to Huntington's theory of democratization. He argues that direct investment from multinational companies impedes the democratization of their host country by keeping the local bourgeoisie from flourishing. In the 1970s and 1980s, countries such as South Korea and Taiwan achieved rapid economic growth by pursuing a protectionist policy. While encouraging local companies to export manufactured products such as clothes and toys, leaders of these two countries blocked the importation of foreign items by imposing high tariffs on them or setting up non-tariff barriers. Meanwhile, they restricted the direct investment of multinational companies in order to protect local industries.

The protectionist policy strengthens the influence of the local bourgeoisie. This class, which is nurtured by authoritarian leaders, cooperates with them over economic

development policies. However, as time progresses, local bourgeois become disillusioned. They come to think that the authoritarian government will not accommodate their increasing demands when their interests conflict with those of dominant elites. Therefore, they urge their government not only to accept their interests but also to move toward democracy. In the meantime, multinational companies persuade their original government to implement policies that urge authoritarian countries to accept democratic reforms. For these corporations, a democratic government would be flexible enough to accommodate their demands.

Some leaders of East Asian countries succeed in maintaining their grip on political and economic power even while attracting huge amounts of foreign investment. Multinational companies, which make enormous profits in these countries, prefer the political status quo to rapid democratic change in their host countries. In other words, if an authoritarian government carries out policies that are favorable to multinational companies, these corporations do not denounce the government for its policies in restricting political human rights. Furthermore, multinational companies sometimes clash with their government over policies toward authoritarian countries. For example, U.S. business corporations are unwilling to criticize the Chinese government for not offering political rights to its people. Therefore, they dissuade their government from adopting harsh policies toward China.

Another hypothesis is that the smaller the economic inequality in a country becomes, the more dominant leaders withhold political human rights. This hypothesis coincides with Lee's theory. He insists that ordinary people who reap benefits from economic development do not like social upheavals caused by the democratic movement,

because political stability brings economic prosperity to them. Authoritarian leaders in a country acknowledge that economic development does not satisfy the increasing demands of all people for economic resources. Those who feel that they do not acquire enough wealth have animosity toward those who reap huge benefits from economic growth. To authoritarian leaders, this situation endangers political stability. Therefore, they try to narrow economic inequalities between the haves and the have-nots by carrying out policies such as reinforcing the social security system and levying higher rate of taxes on rich people. This policy prevents people who belong to the middle or lower classes from complaining of their leaders. In this situation, it is difficult for various organizations in a civil society to mobilize their members to stage a political movement for democracy.

On the other hand, dominant leaders whose country has larger economic inequality tend to guarantee political rights. Authoritarian rulers in a country make a great effort to achieve economic growth in order to legitimize their monopoly on power. Through this development, dictatorial leaders succeed in meeting the basic needs of their people to a certain degree. However, their lust for power motivates them to accumulate huge amounts of economic wealth that should be distributed to people. As a result, the economic cleavage between the rulers and the ruled deepens. This situation provokes organizations of the civil society, which feel alienated by governmental economic policy, to protest against authoritarian rulers. Meanwhile, some members of the local bourgeoisie, who think that dominant elites do not provide them with enough privileges, participate in these protests. At first, authoritarian leaders attempt to quell the democratic movement led by civil society. However, as time passes, they come to realize that the

cost of repression is higher than that of democratization. Consequently, they reach compromises with the civil society and accommodate democracy.

The final hypothesis is that the less urbanized a country becomes, the more dominant leaders in this country withhold political human rights. Industrialization is a key to the process of economic development. Therefore, leaders of a country who want to achieve economic growth try to promote industrialization by fostering the manufacturing industry. In this process, its leaders promote the concentration of factories in urban areas to maximize the effectiveness of industrialization to create more jobs in urban areas. As a result, young people who remain unemployed in their hometowns desperately flock to big cities in order to look for decent jobs.

As more and more people move to urban areas, the government loses the capability to provide additional people with the existing level of education, health care, and so on. Meanwhile, the increasing number of people outstrips those of jobs. Therefore, many people in urban areas become unemployed or underemployed. This situation makes it easier for civil society leaders to organize the protest against the authoritarian regime by attracting disgruntled young people. As the power of people's movement gains momentum, dominant elites come to realize that accommodating the demands of civil society minimizes the possibility of their removal from power. As a result, they ease their restriction on political rights of ordinary people.

The low level of urbanization in a country indicates that industrialization does not proceed in this country. The lack of industrialization deprives a country of the opportunity to accomplish economic growth. Therefore, ordinary people in this country remain poor and uneducated. These people cannot participate in the political process

actively because they focus on sustaining their lives. They are also vulnerable to propaganda because of their lack of education. This environment makes it easy for dominant elites to maintain their firm grip on power. In other words, dominant leaders succeed in restricting political rights without facing people's resistance.

I have two counter hypotheses in terms of foreign investment and economic inequality. My first counter hypothesis is that the more foreign investment a country has, the less dominant leaders in a country withhold political human rights. This hypothesis is related to Larry Diamond's theory of the Western influence on the democratization process. Authoritarian leaders in a country try to attract foreign direct investment in an attempt to achieve economic growth. The foreign investment forces a country to open its economy. The open economic system makes it easier for ordinary people to have contact with the Western world. Through this contact, people learn about the advantages of Western democracy and capitalism. As people's awareness of these two values grows, they become more discontented with their authoritarian rulers. This situation gives rise to people's protest against the dictatorial government. As the democratic movement gains momentum, authoritarian leaders have little choice but to accommodate people's demands for democracy.

My second counter hypothesis is that the smaller the economic inequality a country has, the less dominant leaders in this country withhold political human rights. This argument is associated with the modernization theory. Authoritarian leaders tend to worry that the deep economic cleavage will erode their power base. Therefore, in the process of the distribution of economic wealth, they try to narrow the economic inequality between the rich and the poor. Therefore, many ordinary people can reap

benefits from economic growth. Increasing income enables them to move their concern from economy to politics. In other words, they can have enough time to care about politics of their country. Higher education, which more people can afford, makes it possible for them to learn more about the current political affairs. These people are not deceived by the government propaganda any more. In other words, they come to realize that authoritarian leaders intend to perpetuate their monopoly on political and economic power. In this situation, ordinary people strive to hold back the lust of dominant elites for power. When the power of people's movement overwhelms that of the government, authoritarian leaders have no choice but to reach compromises over political human rights. In other words, dominant rulers accept the democratic system.

My research design controls for Asian values. Throughout history, Asian values that are predicated on the Confucian culture have had a great influence on East Asian countries. The influence of these values may affect the relationship between my independent and dependent variables. My study controls for Asian values by dealing with only East Asian countries.

Data and Variables

In choosing population for my study, I used both the growth rate of GDP and the share of the agricultural sector in GDP in East Asian countries. These two data indicate whether a country follows the path of economic development or not. They originated from the Asian Development Bank (ADB). I did not use recent data for the growth rate of GDP because the Asian economic crisis that had swept East Asia in 1997 exerted a negative influence on the growth rate in East Asian countries.

Country	Growth Rate of GDP (%)	Share of the Agricultural Sector in GDP (%)
Cambodia	3.5	39.2
China (P.R.C)	9.6	15.2
Indonesia	7.8	16.4
Korea (South)	6.7	4.4
Laos	6.9	51.3
Malaysia	10.0	8.4
Mongolia	2.4	24.4
Myanmar	6.4	57.1
Philippines	5.8	15.1
Singapore	7.7	0.1
Taiwan	6.1	1.9
Thailand	5.9	8.6
Vietnam	9.3	24.3

According to this table, all countries except Cambodia recorded over five percent of the growth rate. However, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar depend heavily on the agricultural sector more than other countries. It indicates that these countries have not accomplished industrialization that lays the foundation for economic development. The dependence of Mongolia on the agricultural sector is lower than Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar. However, Mongolia's growth rate is the lowest among East Asian countries. Therefore, I decided to select China (P.R.C), Indonesia, Korea (South), Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam as the population of economically developing Asian nation-states for this study.

In order to test my hypotheses, I will use secondary data that originate from reliable international institutions. For the measurement of the dependent variable, I will use the data from the Freedom House and the World Bank. Every year, Freedom House publishes the book titled *Freedom in the World*. This book contains the freedom ratings of 192 independent countries around the world. These authors assess the status of political rights and civil liberties in these countries. They not only measure the ratings of

the two categories separately, but they also calculate the combined average ratings of both categories.

These authors score the countries from one to seven. One represents the most free and seven the least free. Countries whose combined average ratings are from 1 to 2.5 belong to the category of ‘free countries.’ Countries, which have average ratings from 3 to 5, are categorized as ‘partly free countries.’ Countries whose average ratings are from 5.5 to 7 belong to the category of ‘not free countries.’ The freedom ratings indicate the extent to which dominant leaders in a country guarantee political human rights.

In 2002, the World Bank published the book titled *Growth without Governance*. This book contains an accountability indicator. This indicator measures the extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of their government. I use this data to demonstrate construct validity for the freedom ratings. Construct validity is defined as validity demonstrated for a measure by showing that it is related to the measure of another concept. In order to corroborate this validity, I compared the freedom ratings of East Asian countries with the accountability ones.

Freedom Rating (1- 7)	Country	Accountability Rating (-2.5 to +2.5)	Country
1.5	Taiwan	+0.98	Korea (South)
2	Korea (South)	+0.83	Taiwan
2.5	Philippines	+0.53	Philippines
2.5	Thailand	+0.37	Thailand
3.5	Indonesia	+0.11	Singapore
5	Malaysia	- 0.13	Malaysia
5	Singapore	-0.40	Indonesia
6.5	China (P.R.C)	-1.11	China (P.R.C)
6.5	Vietnam	-1.29	Vietnam

According to the table above, the country ranking for the freedom ratings does not differ much from the accountability ratings. In other words, the former is strongly associated with the latter. The only exception is Indonesia. In terms of the freedom ratings, Indonesia ranks above Malaysia and Singapore. On the other hand, Indonesia is below the two countries in terms of the accountability ratings. However, the rankings of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore are changeable in the two measurements because both the freedom and accountability ratings of these countries are near the averages. Therefore, the accountability ratings of East Asian countries demonstrate construct validity for the freedom ratings of these countries.

Validity is defined as the correspondence between a measure and the concept it is supposed to measure. The concept of my dependent variable is abstract. The freedom ratings, which I use to measure political human rights, consist of two parts: political rights and civil liberties. The 'political rights' part measures the extent to which people participate freely in the political process. 'Civil liberties' measures a person's freedom to develop views, institutions, and personal autonomy apart from the state. Freedom House produces the freedom ratings by surveying both political rights and civil liberties in 192 countries. Therefore, the measurement of the freedom ratings coincides with the basic concept of political human rights that emphasizes not only people's participation in the

political process but also freedom of expression, assembly, and conscience. In other words, my dependent variable has validity

For the measurement of my independent variables, I collected data from the Asian Development Bank (ADB). This institution issues the economic and social indicators of Asian countries excluding Middle Eastern ones. The data from the Asian Development Bank are very helpful to measure foreign investment, economic inequality, and urbanization in East Asian countries.

One of my independent variables is foreign investment. My measurement for this variable is the total amount of the inflow of foreign investment. It indicates whether the economic development of a country relies heavily on foreign direct investment or not. I use the 1996 data of the inflow of foreign investment from the Asian Development Bank because the Asian economic crisis that had occurred in 1997 disrupted the inflow of foreign investment in East Asian countries.

Another independent variable is economic inequality. My measurement for this variable is the income ratio of highest 20% to lowest 20%, which derives from the Asian Development Bank. The income ratio compares the income of upper twenty-percent of the richest people with that of lower twenty-percent of the poorest ones. This indicator demonstrates the degree of the economic cleavage between the rich and the poor in East Asian countries.

Another independent variable is urbanization. My measurement for this variable is the percentage of the urban population among the total in East Asian countries. This percentage indicates the extent of the urbanization process in these countries.

The concepts of my independent variables are very specific. For example, the total amount of foreign direct investment in a country is a good measurement for my independent variable of foreign investment. As a result, all of my independent variables have validity because my data directly correspond to the concepts of foreign investment, economic inequality, and urbanization.

Methods

I compare nine East Asian countries with each other in terms of the independent and dependent variables. I have a small population for the study. Therefore, I will use the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) method for the data analysis. This method is proper to deal with a small number in a population. It also enables me to simplify the complicated patterns of the independent and dependent variables. In other words, the QCA method makes it easier for me to find out what makes leaders in some East Asian countries withhold political human rights.

Results

For the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) method, I set up a table that includes the amount of foreign investment, income ratio, the percentage of urban population, and the freedom ratings in China, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam. This table also contains the averages of the independent and dependent variables in these countries. I ranked the countries by the freedom ratings that ranged from '1.5' (free) to '6.5' (not free). By using this table, I compare my populations with each other in terms of foreign investment, economic inequality, urbanization and political human rights.

	<i>Independent Variable</i>			Dependent Variable
	Foreign Investment (US \$)	<i>Income Ratio</i>	Urban Population (%)	Political Rights (ranking)
Taiwan	1,864,000,000	5.5	60	1.5
Korea (South)	2,326,000,000	5.3	82.5	2
Philippines	1,517,000,000	12.5	59.4	2.5
Thailand	2,335,900,000	9.3	20	2.5
Indonesia	6,194,000,000	4	42.1	3.5
Malaysia	5,078,000,000	12.3	58.1	5
Singapore	10,371,000,000	8.5	100	5
China (P.R.C)	40,180,000,000	7.9	36.7	6.5
Vietnam	2,395,000,000	5.6	24.5	6.5
Average	8,028,988,889	7.877777778	53.7	3.888888889

After producing the above table, I simplified it by using the label of ‘0’ and ‘1’.

In terms of the independent variables, I labeled ‘0’ for countries below the averages and ‘1’ for countries above the averages. On the other hand, I labeled ‘1’ for countries whose freedom ratings were below the average because these countries guarantee more political rights than those above the average.

	<i>Independent Variable</i>			Dependent Variable
	Foreign Investment (US \$)	<i>Income Ratio</i>	Urban Population (%)	Political Rights (Ranking)
<i>Taiwan</i>	0	0	1	1
Korea (South)	0	0	1	1
Philippines	0	1	1	1
Thailand	0	1	0	1
Indonesia	0	0	0	1
Malaysia	0	1	1	0
Singapore	1	1	1	0
China (P.R.C)	1	1	0	0
Vietnam	0	0	0	0

By using the results of the above table, I set up a new table that contains the patterns of countries that restrict or guarantee political human rights. In the new table, I used alphabetical labels. In terms of foreign investment, I replaced ‘0’ with ‘f’ and ‘1’ with ‘F’. For income ratio, I labeled ‘i’ for ‘0’ and ‘I’ for ‘1’. In case of urban population, I replaced ‘0’ with ‘u’ and ‘1’ with ‘U’. For political human rights, I labeled ‘p’ for ‘0’ and ‘P’ for ‘1’.

P	<i>Taiwan</i>	fiU	p	<i>Malaysia</i>	fiU
	Korea (South)	fiU		Singapore	FIU
	Philippines	fiU		China (P.R.C)	Flu
	Thailand	flu		Vietnam	fiu
	Indonesia	fiu			

According to the above table, there are two instances in which the same combination belongs to both 'P' and 'p' categories. The Philippines and Malaysia have the same combination of 'fIU'. However, the Philippines belong to a group of countries that guarantee political rights, while Malaysia is one country that denies them. The rating of political rights of the Philippines is 2.5. The rating of Malaysia is 5. The average rating of nine countries is about 3.9. The rating of the Philippines is lower than the average by 1.4. The rating of Malaysia is higher than the average by 1.1. The ratings of these two countries can be regarded as close to the average. In other words, the difference between the Philippines and Malaysia in terms of political human rights is not that big. Therefore, I included the pattern of 'fIU' in analyzing conditions that lead Asian countries to guarantee political rights.

Indonesia and Vietnam have the same combination of 'fiu'. However, Indonesia belongs to the category of countries that offer political human rights. On the other hand, Vietnam is one of the countries that restrict these rights. The rating of political rights of Indonesia is 3.5, which is close to the average of 3.89. The rating of Vietnam is 6.5, which is far away from the average. The difference between the two countries in terms of political rights can be regarded as big. In other words, this case is an exceptional pattern. Therefore, I dropped out the combination of 'fiu'.

In accordance with my research question, I analyzed the patterns of countries that withhold political human rights. The category of 'p' consists of 'fIU', 'FIU', 'FIu', and 'fiu'. I dropped out 'fiu' because this combination leads to contradictory results. I did not consider the pattern of 'fIU' for analyzing what leads countries to withhold political rights. Therefore, I considered two combinations of 'FIU' and 'FIu' for the data analysis.

The common elements of the two patterns are 'F' and 'I'. In other words, both 'F' and 'I' can be regarded as necessary conditions for withholding political human rights.

I can support my hypothesis concerning foreign direct investment because 'F' is a necessary condition for restricting political rights. In other words, I can insist that the more foreign direct investment a country has, the more it withholds political rights. My hypothesis concerning foreign investment coincides with Huntington's theory. He insists that foreign direct investment impedes the emergence of the local bourgeoisie. Therefore, leaders who attract huge amounts of foreign investment can maintain their firm grip on power. My results concerning foreign direct investment bolsters Huntington's argument.

The result implicates that Western multinational companies investing their resources in East Asian countries do not galvanize the democratization process in these countries. In other words, the Western economic influence does not push authoritarian leaders in East Asia to democratization. Therefore, Western policy makers can encourage the democratization process in East Asian countries by helping the indigenous bourgeoisie of these countries enhance their power.

In terms of economic inequality, I cannot support my second hypothesis. In other words, I cannot argue that the smaller the economic inequality in a country becomes, the more dominant leaders withhold political human rights. The reason is that 'I' (large economic inequality) is a necessary condition for less political rights. This hypothesis is associated with the argument of Lee Kwan Yu. He insists that leaders in a country try to narrow economic inequalities between the haves and the have-nots in order to curb political instability. This policy prevents ordinary people from complaining of their leaders because these people reap benefits from economic growth. Therefore,

authoritarian leaders can restrict political human rights without people's resistance. My test discourages me from bolstering the Lee's theory of economic inequality.

Instead, I can support the counter hypothesis concerning economic inequality. In other words, I argue that the less the economic inequality a country has, the less dominant leaders in this country withhold political human rights. This argument is related to the modernization theory. In accordance with this theory, ordinary people who reap benefits from economic development enable them to move their concern from economic survival to politics. Furthermore, higher education, which more and more people can afford, makes it possible for them to learn more about current political affairs. In this situation, authoritarian leaders cannot perpetuate their monopoly on power because of the increasing influence of people's power. The test result bolsters the modernization theory in terms of economic inequality.

The result demonstrates that large economic inequality enables authoritarian leaders in East Asia to restrict political human rights. In this context, reducing the economic cleavage between the haves and the have-nots galvanizes the democratization process. Therefore, Western policy makers can promote democracy in East Asia by focusing more on the problem of economic inequality in this region.

I also dealt with the patterns belonging to the category 'P'. In other words, I tried to find what makes some East Asian countries guarantee political rights. The category 'P' consists of 'fiU', 'fIU', 'fIU', and 'fIU'. I did not consider the pattern of 'fIU' because it leads to contradictory results. The common element of all three combinations is 'f'. It indicates that 'f' is a necessary condition for guaranteeing political rights. In the meantime, I simplified the patterns of 'fiU' + 'fIU' + 'fIU'. The common elements of the

first two patterns are 'f' and 'U'. In terms of the combinations of 'fIU' and 'fIU', the common elements are 'f' and 'I'. Therefore, the combinations of 'fIU' + 'fIU' + 'fIU' can be transformed into 'fU' + 'fI'. The simplified patterns of 'fU' and 'fI' are regarded as sufficient, but not necessary conditions.

This analysis holds that small amount of foreign investment is a necessary condition for guaranteeing political rights. Therefore, I can support my first hypothesis that the more foreign investment a country has, the more it withholds political rights. The big economic inequality is not a necessary condition for more political rights. In other words, I cannot contend that the bigger the economic inequality a country has, the less dominant leaders in this country withhold political rights. However, the big economic inequality, if combined with small amount of foreign investment, can lead East Asian countries to guarantee political human rights. The high degree of urbanization is not a necessary condition for guaranteeing political rights. Therefore, I cannot bolster my hypothesis that the more urbanized a country becomes, the less dominant leaders in this country withhold political human rights. However, the high degree of urbanization, if combined with small amount of foreign investment, can make leaders of some East Asian countries offer political rights to their people.

Generalizability and Limitations

Internal validity means the ability to show that manipulation or variation of the independent variable causes the dependent variable to change. In order to establish the internal validity of my research design, I should verify that the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent one is non-spurious. My research design

controls for Asian values because populations in the research are only East Asian countries. In other words, the Asian culture is a constant in my research. As a result, I can establish the internal validity for my research design.

External validity can be defined as the ability to generalize from one set of research findings to other situation. In order to establish the external validity, my research design about East Asian countries should be generalized to other ones. My research is predicated on countries that have been influenced by the Confucian culture. In other words, I test the relationships between the independent and dependent variables in the context of Asian countries. However, I think that my research can be applied to other developing countries whose cultures differ from those of East Asian countries. Throughout history, developing countries have tried to achieve economic development in accordance with the modernization theory. For example, many nation-states in the Third World have pursued the industrialization policy, while ignoring the agricultural industry. After accomplishing economic development, these countries face the same political problems that result from this development. Therefore, the results of my research design can be generalized to countries outside East Asia.

Conclusion

I try to answer what makes leaders in some East Asian countries withhold political human rights more than others. My independent variables are foreign investment, economic inequality, and urbanization. My dependent variable is political human rights. I tested my three hypotheses by using the Qualitative Comparative

Analysis (QCA). In other words, I tried to find whether each independent variable is strongly related to the dependent variable.

My research holds that the amount of foreign investment has a strong impact on whether leaders in East Asian countries restrict political rights or not. I hypothesize that the more foreign investment a country has, the more it withholds political rights. My test enables me to support this hypothesis that coincides with the Huntington's theory. I can support Huntington's argument about the relationship between foreign investment and democratization.

This research demonstrates that large economic inequality also has an influence on whether political leaders in East Asian countries withhold political human rights or not. My QCA test runs counter to my second hypothesis that the smaller the economic inequality becomes in a country, the more dominant leaders in this country withhold political rights. Therefore, I cannot support Lee's argument about the relationship between economic inequality and democratization. Instead, I can bolster my counter hypothesis that the small economic inequality makes leaders in some East Asian countries guarantee political human rights. It indicates that I can support the modernization theory in terms of economic inequality. In addition, my research holds that the big economic inequality, if combined with small amount of foreign investment, leads East Asian countries to offer political rights.

My research indicates that the level of urbanization does not have an influence on whether leaders in East Asian countries restrict or guarantee political human rights. The low level of urbanization does not necessarily make a country restrict political human rights. Therefore, I cannot argue that the less urbanized a country becomes, the more

dominant leaders in this country withhold political human rights. Simultaneously, my test demonstrates that the high degree of urbanization does not necessarily lead a country to guarantee political rights. However, the research holds that the high level of urbanization that goes along with small amount of foreign investment makes leaders in East Asian countries offer political human rights.

My study motivates me to extend my interests in the relationship between economic development and political human rights to other Third World countries. In other words, I aspire to find whether the results from my research are applicable to developing countries in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. Throughout my study, I found that foreign investment has a negative impact on democratization. Meanwhile, economic inequality has a pivotal influence on whether leaders in a country withhold political rights or not.

I will answer whether these economic factors have an impact on democratization in non-Asian developing countries in future research. In my study, I dealt with populations because I wanted to deal with East Asian countries that have achieved economic development. However, in future research, I will tackle not only countries that have accomplished economic growth but also those that have not. The extended populations will produce more reliable results about the relationship between my independent and dependent variables. Simultaneously, including as many countries as possible enables me to use the statistical method for the data analysis. This method may complement the QCA. In other words, statistics may enable me to produce new results that I did not acquire by using the QCA method.

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