PUBLIC OPINION OF DETERMINATE SENTENCING

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Research Question

Although the public often has disagreements over which parts of the legal system should be reformed, most people probably do not understand the importance of sentencing in the judicial system. People may not realize there is a debate over different types of sentencing procedures; however, they could have an opinion on how judges should reach their decisions on sentencing. In some jurisdictions, laws have been passed to give judges a guideline to follow when sentencing convicted offenders. This may be set up as a range of length of prison terms or it may include a minimum or maximum sentence. However, in many jurisdictions, judges are given a considerable amount of discretion over their sentencing.

Some legislatures have voted to enact determinate sentencing, so some states clearly believe sentencing limits are advantageous. However, not all jurisdictions have decided to use sentencing limits. This makes it clear that some people do not support limits on judicial discretion. How do we explain the variation in individual attitudes concerning the discretion given to judges in sentencing?

This paper will consider individual responses to a survey across all 50 states involving state criminal courts in the United States. The discretion that I am explaining is individual attitudes regarding the fact that in similar cases, one judge may sentence the defendant to five years in prison while another judge may sentence the defendant to six months in prison and yet another may order probation. Granted, some of this variation has to do with the laws set forth in each jurisdiction, but beyond that judges are almost free to do as they choose. Judges may use things such as the convict's socioeconomic status, gender, or race to discretely influence the sentence.

On the other hand, some jurisdictions have sentencing limits, which are used as a guideline for judges to determine a sentence for any case. The guidelines establish the

minimum and maximum sentences for a particular crime. The judge has a minimal amount of discretion within the given limits, but this is far less discretion than that given to judges who do not have a set of guidelines they must follow when determining a sentence.

It is important to know why members of society support limits on judges' discretion. This information would be valuable to political parties and candidates for judicial seats. The political parties would be able to target that part of society that they need to influence to support their position on sentencing limits. Further, it would help the party to have a general idea of which people would vote for one of their candidates who supports determinate sentencing. Those people who are not strictly for or against determinate sentencing could be seen as swing voters, and the party may focus on these people when looking for additional votes.

I will hypothesize that higher class, conservative, educated white males are more likely to support the limits on sentencing in cases. Upper class citizens are more likely to want all people to receive the same punishment for the same crime. They may believe that they have more influence in the government and want the judges to follow the laws that have been made according to their beliefs. Lower class citizens have less representation and would believe that the courts are the only way they will receive fair treatment. They would want the judge to take their circumstances into account when deciding their case. Likewise, females tend to focus more on issues related to the well being of others, so they would want to include circumstantial evidence. Men, on the other hand, would be more likely to focus primarily on the facts of the case. Also, conservatives have more faith in the actions of their representatives and would not want individual judges altering sentences based on characteristics of a case. They would prefer that the judges strictly follow the law and that everyone receive approximately the same sentence.

Literature Review

Three theories can be used to explain public opinion on sentencing guidelines in convictions. They are structuralism, social choice theory, and rational choice theory.

Structuralism contends that the government and law should retain its original form simply because it is the legal system. Personal characteristics are irrelevant in this system, and law takes precedence over everything (Harris II.) This theory can apply to the example because it would show how people believe the law is not adjustable. Structuralists would believe that determinate sentencing would be the most just because it does not take into account specific circumstances or characteristics of defendants. These people put all power in the hands of government and trust that government and the law will offer the best solution for problems.

Social choice theory makes the argument that people are altruistic and make choices that result in the greatest good for the greatest number. People prefer to make choices that are fair for everyone (Lissowski.) This theory would be applicable to the example because it would argue that people would want the government to do what is most beneficial for society as a whole. Since most of society is not involved in criminal cases, public opinion under this theory would support determinate sentencing so as to avoid letting some defendants slip through the cracks while others have to carry out long sentences. It would support everyone receiving the same sentence in order to help the greatest number, which would be society as a whole. By forcing all offenders to have the same punishment, the rest of society would be protected from these offenders.

Rational choice theory is the idea that people are self-interested and only support legislative action that serves their personal interests. People are not interested in helping others and do not offer support to programs that do not affect them personally (Knight.) This theory can be applied to the case because it would argue that people would only want determinate sentencing if they do not run the risk of getting caught engaging in criminal behavior. Based this theory, people who take part in criminal acts would not want determinate sentencing because they would hope that their particular characteristics and circumstantial evidence would convince the judge to give them a lenient sentence if they ever went to trial. On the other hand, people who do not commit crimes would want the offenders to get a strict sentence in order to prevent themselves from coming in contact with these offenders.

The best theory for this hypothesis is structuralism. This is because structuralism is based on the idea that those who are represented in government action are most likely to support strict interpretation of laws.

Hypothesis and Theory

The theory of structuralism maintains that law is superior simply because it is the law. This system of checks and balances on the branches of the government keeps the power of any branch at a minimized level. This reduces the amount of discretion in any branch that actually is made into law (Harris II.) Therefore, the judicial system is not able to alter laws made by the legislature to fit particular trials. The judges are not able to have complete discretion when handing down sentences. Structuralism is based on the unimportance of circumstantial criteria and the importance of the larger body of the legal system (Harris II.) Under structuralism, a judge should not be able to alter sentences based on personal characteristics of convicts instead of the facts of the case. Rather, the judges would follow a set of guidelines to determine the sentence in any case based on the criterion of the case. Therefore, a person who supports structuralism is more likely to accept determinate sentencing than someone who does not support structuralism.

Under this theory of structuralism, I can deduce who would be more likely to support the sentencing guidelines in criminal cases. First, men are more likely than women to support structuralism. This is because women often base their ideas on circumstantial evidence rather than on facts. Further, higher income people would be more likely to support sentencing guidelines. This is because they would be more likely to be treated fairly by the laws in place. These people are more likely to have influence with representatives, so the legislator would voice an opinion similar to that of the constituents who lend their support. The laws which are enacted would reflect the opinions of the upper class because these people influence the decision of the representative who influences the decision of Congress. The same would be true of any group that is more likely to vote and have its opinion heard in Congress, such as those with higher levels of education or whites. Therefore, I hypothesize that higher income, conservative, educated white men are more likely to support determinate sentencing guidelines.

Data and Method

The data set I am using to test my hypothesis is "Public Image of Courts" from 1977. I am using the variable 'how judges should sentence' as my dependent variable. This variable is divided into different levels of discretion given to judges. The possible responses are 'same sentence for everyone', 'limited discretion', and 'unlimited discretion.' The independent variables I am testing are age, race, ideology, family income, highest education completed, marital status, and gender.

Table 1:AGE

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	18 - 20 years	115	6.0	6.0	6.0
	21 - 24 years	199	10.3	10.3	16.3
	25 - 29 years	261	13.5	13.5	29.8
	30 - 34 years	230	11.9	11.9	41.8
	35 - 39 years	176	9.1	9.1	50.9
	40 - 44 years	160	8.3	8.3	59.2
	45 - 49 years	129	6.7	6.7	65.9
	50 - 54 years	146	7.6	7.6	73.4
	55 - 59 years	117	6.1	6.1	79.5
	60 - 64 years	125	6.5	6.5	86.0
	65 years and over	270	14.0	14.0	100.0
	Total	1928	99.8	100.0	
Missing	No response	3	.2		
Total		1931	100.0		

Based on table 1, I will recode age into young (18-30), middle aged (31-49), and over 50 (50-99). This will separate the age of respondents into three categories which approximately make up one-third of the survey responses each. These categories are not the same range in years, but they do reflect a third of the respondents' range of ages.

Table 2:RACE BY OBSERVATION

Based on table 2, race will remain coded into white, Black, and other. These are not based on a percentage of the total range, but these different race categories do need to be taken into account.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	White	1687	87.4	87.4	87.4
	Black	187	9.7	9.7	97.0
	Other	57	3.0	3.0	100.0
	Total	1931	100.0	100.0	

Table 3:DEGREE POL PERSUASION

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very conservative	182	9.4	18.5	18.5
	Somewhat conservative	475	24.6	48.2	66.7
	Very liberal	104	5.4	10.6	77.3
	Somewhat liberal	224	11.6	22.7	100.0
	Total	985	51.0	100.0	
Missing	Not applicable; coded 3 or 9 in Dem	933	48.3		
	No response	13	.7		
	Total	946	49.0		
Total		1931	100.0		

Based on table 3, ideology will be recoded as very conservative, somewhat conservative, very liberal, and somewhat liberal. This will keep the same categories as are already in the survey, but it eliminates the respondents who do not fall into one of these categories.

Table 4:TOTAL FAMILY INCOME

Based on table 4, income will be recoded as low (0-$10,000), middle ($10,001-17,000), and high income ($17,001 and above). These income levels were calculated by doing a frequency and dividing the categories according to thirds of the total sample. These are not probably representative of the top, middle, and bottom third of income in society.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Under $5,000	234	12.1	13.6	13.6
	$5,000 - $7,499	155	8.0	9.0	22.5
	$7,500 - $9,999	195	10.1	11.3	33.8
	$10,000 - $14,999	360	18.6	20.9	54.7
	$15,000 - $19,999	310	16.1	18.0	72.7
	$20,000 - $24,999	219	11.3	12.7	85.3
	$25,000 - $34,999	163	8.4	9.4	94.8
	$35,000 and over	90	4.7	5.2	100.0
	Total	1726	89.4	100.0	
Missing	No response	205	10.6		
Total		1931	100.0		

Table 5:EDUCATION

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Grade school or less	193	10.0	10.1	10.1
	Some high school	311	16.1	16.3	26.4
	Graduated high school	615	31.8	32.3	58.7
	Some college	444	23.0	23.3	82.0
	Graduated college	201	10.4	10.5	92.5
	Postgraduate college	142	7.4	7.5	100.0
	Total	1906	98.7	100.0	
Missing	No response	25	1.3		
Total		1931	100.0		

Based on table 5, education will be recoded as high school degree or less, some college, and college degree. I combined some of the categories in order to make the testing process easier and to make the categories closer percentages of the total sample. The categories do not reflect thirds of the total sample, but they are much closer than the original variable.

Table 6:MARITAL STATUS

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Single	306	15.8	15.9	15.9

	Married	1308	67.7	68.2	84.1
	Widowed	156	8.1	8.1	92.2
	Divorced, separated	149	7.7	7.8	100.0
	Total	1919	99.4	100.0	
Missing	No response	12	.6		
Total		1931	100.0		

Based on table 6, marital status will be coded as single, married, widowed, or divorced. I eliminated any respondents who did not fit into one of these categories.

Table 7:SEX BY OBSERVATION

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Female	965	50.0	50.0	50.0
	Male	966	50.0	50.0	100.0
	Total	1931	100.0	100.0	

Based on table 7, gender will remain coded as male or female.

I will use crosstabulation tables to test each variable against the nominal dependent variable. I will use chi-square to reject the null hypothesis. The larger the chi-square is, the more likely there is a relationship between the two variables. In the cross tab table, in order to reject the null hypothesis, I will need a significance level of .05 or less. I will also use phi, Cramer's v., and the contingency coefficient to test the strength of the relationships. The closer these numbers are to one, the stronger the relationship between the two variables being tested.

Results

Of the crosstab tables that I ran, the only ones that showed any variation among the categories at all were race, family income, and highest level of education completed.

Test 1:Recoded How Judge Should Sentence * recoded age Crosstabulation

			recoded age			Total
			Young	Middle Aged	Old	
Recoded How Judge Should Sentence	Same Sentence for Everyone	Count	45	68	75	188
		% within recoded age	8.6%	10.6%	12.2%	10.6%
	Limited Discretion	Count	313	371	335	1019
		% within recoded age	59.7%	58.1%	54.3%	57.2%
	Unlimited Discretion	Count	165	200	206	571
		% within recoded age	31.5%	31.3%	33.4%	32.1%
	Uncertain	Count	1		1	2
		% within recoded age	.2%		.2%	.1%
Total		Count	524	639	617	1780
		% within recoded age	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	6.648	6	.355
Likelihood Ratio	7.368	6	.288
Linear-by-Linear Association	.195	1	.659
N of Valid Cases	1780		

a 3 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .59.

Crosstab table 1, which tests the impact of age on opinion of determinate sentencing, does not show significant variation. The significance level is not high

enough to reject the null that age has no impact on how a person views determinate sentencing.

Test 2:Recoded How Judge Should Sentence * Recoded Marital Status Crosstabulation

			Recoded Marital Status				Total
			Single	Married	Widowed	Divorced	
Recoded How Judge Should Sentence	Same Sentence for Everyone	Count	23	133	18	14	188
		% within Recoded Marital Status	8.1%	11.0%	12.1%	10.9%	10.6%
	Limited Discretion	Count	177	693	80	67	1017
		% within Recoded Marital Status	62.1%	57.2%	53.7%	51.9%	57.3%
	Unlimited Discretion	Count	85	386	50	47	568
		% within Recoded Marital Status	29.8%	31.8%	33.6%	36.4%	32.0%
	Uncertain	Count			1	1	2
		% within Recoded Marital Status			.7%	.8%	.1%
Total		Count	285	1212	149	129	1775
		% within Recoded Marital Status	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	16.507	9	.057

Likelihood Ratio	13.208	9	.153
Linear-by-Linear Association	.674	1	.412
N of Valid Cases	1775		

a 4 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .15.

Test 2 shows that there is not significant variation between marital status and how a person views determinate sentencing. The levels of significance are not low enough to reject the null hypothesis that marital status has no impact on which form of sentencing a person will prefer.

Test 3:Recoded How Judge Should Sentence * Recoded Gender Crosstabulation

			Recoded Gender		Total
			Female	Male	
Recoded How Judge Should Sentence	Same Sentence for Everyone	Count	97	92	189
		% within Recoded Gender	10.9%	10.3%	10.6%
	Limited Discretion	Count	504	516	1020
		% within Recoded Gender	56.8%	57.6%	57.2%
	Unlimited Discretion	Count	284	288	572
		% within Recoded Gender	32.0%	32.1%	32.1%
	Uncertain	Count	2		2
		% within Recoded Gender	.2%		.1%
Total		Count	887	896	1783
		% within Recoded Gender	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2.256	3	.521
Likelihood Ratio	3.029	3	.387
Linear-by-Linear Association	.014	1	.907
N of Valid Cases	1783		

a 2 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .99.

Based on test 3, there is not significant variation between gender and a person's opinion on determinate sentencing. The significance levels are not low enough to reject

the null hypothesis that gender has no impact on how a person views determinate sentencing.

Test 4:Recoded How Judge Should Sentence * Recoded Degree of Political Persuasion Crosstabulation

			Recoded Degree of Political Persuasion				Total
			Very Conservative	Somewhat Conservative	Very Liberal	Somewhat Liberal	
Recoded How Judge Should Sentence	Same Sentence for Everyone	Count	18	44	12	17	91
		% within Recoded Degree of Political Persuasion	10.5%	9.8%	12.2%	8.1%	9.8%
	Limited Discretion	Count	98	258	56	133	545
		% within Recoded Degree of Political Persuasion	57.3%	57.3%	57.1%	63.0%	58.6%
	Unlimited Discretion	Count	54	148	30	60	292
		% within Recoded Degree of Political Persuasion	31.6%	32.9%	30.6%	28.4%	31.4%
	Uncertain	Count	1			1	2
		% within Recoded Degree of Political Persuasion	.6%			.5%	.2%
Total		Count	171	450	98	211	930
		% within Recoded Degree of Political Persuasion	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	6.113	9	.729
Likelihood Ratio	6.764	9	.662
Linear-by-Linear Association	.131	1	.717
N of Valid Cases	930		

a 4 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .21.

Based on test 4, no significant variation exists between ideology and how one views determinate sentencing. The significance levels are not low enough to reject the

null hypothesis that ideology has no impact on whether one supports determinate sentencing.

Test 5:Recoded How Judge Should Sentence * Recoded Race Crosstabulation

			Recoded Race			Total
			White	Black	Other	
Recoded How Judge Should Sentence	Same Sentence for Everyone	Count	158	20	11	189
		% within Recoded Race	10.1%	12.3%	20.8%	10.6%
	Limited Discretion	Count	902	93	25	1020
		% within Recoded Race	57.6%	57.1%	47.2%	57.2%
	Unlimited Discretion	Count	505	50	17	572
		% within Recoded Race	32.2%	30.7%	32.1%	32.1%
	Uncertain	Count	2			2
		% within Recoded Race	.1%			.1%
Total		Count	1567	163	53	1783
		% within Recoded Race	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	7.335	6	.291
Likelihood Ratio	6.485	6	.371
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.089	1	.148
N of Valid Cases	1783		

a 3 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .06.

In test 5, of respondent's race, those who were not considered white or Black were most likely to prefer the same sentence for everyone. However, the significance level was not below .05, so I cannot use this to reject the null hypothesis that race has no impact on opinion of discretion for judges.

Test 6:Recoded How Judge Should Sentence * Recoded Family Income Crosstabulation

			Recoded Family Income			Total
			Low	Middle	High	
Recoded How Judge Should Sentence	Same Sentence for Everyone	Count	61	72	41	174
		% within Recoded Family Income	11.4%	11.7%	9.2%	10.9%
	Limited Discretion	Count	296	342	278	916
		% within Recoded Family Income	55.4%	55.3%	62.6%	57.4%
	Unlimited Discretion	Count	176	203	125	504
		% within Recoded Family Income	33.0%	32.8%	28.2%	31.6%
	Uncertain	Count	1	1		2
		% within Recoded Family Income	.2%	.2%		.1%
Total		Count	534	618	444	1596
		% within Recoded Family Income	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	7.576	6	.271
Likelihood Ratio	8.162	6	.227
Linear-by-Linear Association	.534	1	.465
N of Valid Cases	1596		

a 3 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .56.

In test 6 regarding the respondent's family income, higher income people were most likely to want limited discretion in sentencing. Once again, the significance level was not below .05, so I cannot reject the null hypothesis that income has no effect on opinion of determinate sentencing.

Test 7:Recoded How Judge Should Sentence * Recoded Education Crosstabulation

			Recoded Education			Total
			HS degree or less	some college	college degree	
Recoded How Judge Should Sentence	Same Sentence for Everyone	Count	128	38	22	188
		% within Recoded Education	12.5%	9.2%	6.8%	10.7%
	Limited Discretion	Count	531	252	226	1009
		% within Recoded Education	51.7%	60.7%	70.0%	57.2%
	Unlimited Discretion	Count	367	124	75	566
		% within Recoded Education	35.7%	29.9%	23.2%	32.1%
	Uncertain	Count	1	1		2
		% within Recoded Education	.1%	.2%		.1%
Total		Count	1027	415	323	1765
		% within Recoded Education	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	37.846	6	.000
Likelihood Ratio	38.850	6	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	3.084	1	.079
N of Valid Cases	1765		

a 3 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .37.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.146	.000
	Cramer's V	.104	.000
	Contingency Coefficient	.145	.000
N of Valid Cases		1765	

a Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

Based on test 7 regarding the highest education level of the respondent was the only test that had significant variation that permitted me to reject the null hypothesis that education has no impact on the amount of discretion a person believes judges should have. This crosstab showed that the higher education level one has, the more likely he or she is to prefer limited discretion as opposed to no discretion or unlimited discretion. The chi-square for this table was 37.846. In order to reject the null, the chi-square has to be larger than 12.5916 for 5% error. The significance level was .000, which shows that it is impossible to get these results if the null hypothesis were true. Phi has a value of .146, which shows that there is not a strong relationship between the variables. The value of Cramer's v. is .104, which also shows a weak relationship between the variables. The contingency coefficient has a value of .145 and shows there is a weak relationship between the variables. This shows that education level has a definite impact on whether a person believes judges should have discretion when handing down sentences.

When I discovered that most of the variables I tested did not have significant variation, I then tested whether a person believes biased judges are a problem with the discretion that should be given to judges. I did this additional test because my original independent variables did not result in significant variance. I recoded whether biased judges are a problem into not a problem, a problem, and a serious problem.

Test 8:Recoded How Judge Should Sentence * Recoded Biased Judges Problem Crosstabulation

			Recoded			Total

			Biased Judges Problem			
			no problem	problem	serious problem	
Recoded How Judge Should Sentence	Same Sentence for Everyone	Count	23	81	66	170
		% within Recoded Biased Judges Problem	11.6%	8.3%	13.3%	10.1%
	Limited Discretion	Count	104	589	266	959
		% within Recoded Biased Judges Problem	52.3%	60.2%	53.4%	57.2%
	Unlimited Discretion	Count	72	308	165	545
		% within Recoded Biased Judges Problem	36.2%	31.5%	33.1%	32.5%
	Uncertain	Count		1	1	2
		% within Recoded Biased Judges Problem		.1%	.2%	.1%
Total		Count	199	979	498	1676
		% within Recoded Biased Judges Problem	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	13.867	6	.031
Likelihood Ratio	13.851	6	.031
Linear-by-Linear Association	.996	1	.318
N of Valid Cases	1676		

a 3 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .24.

Symmetric Measures

Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.091			.031
	Cramer's V	.064			.031
	Contingency Coefficient	.091			.031

a Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

Based on test 8, I discovered that if you think biased judges are a problem, you are more likely to prefer limited discretion. However, if you think biased judges are a serious problem, you are more likely to prefer the same sentence for everyone. The chi-square for this table was 13.867. The degrees of freedom were six, and based on a 5% error rate, the chi-square needed to exceed 12.5916. Therefore, there is a slight relationship between the variables. Also, phi, Cramer's v., and the contingency coefficient were each .031, which shows that there is a relationship; but it is not a strong relationship.

Implications

This paper examined why some people support determinate sentencing and others do not. My hypothesis was that higher class, conservative, white males were more likely to support the determinate sentencing. The results showed that none of these had an impact on which method you would prefer judges to follow. However, I did discover that the more educated you are, the more likely you prefer some limits on discretion. After additional testing, I also found that if you believe biased judges are a serious problem, you are more likely to prefer determinate sentencing. Likewise, if you think biased judges are only a small problem, you are more likely to prefer some limits on sentencing discretion.

This is important because a political party will be able to predict which people would support their candidate if she has determinate sentencing in her platform. The party leaders would know that people who are more educated are more likely to support limited discretion, so they would want to focus on these people as swing votes.

Further research and statistical work on this topic should include whether people base their view of determinate sentencing on previous experiences in court and whether these experiences were good or not. I would predict that people who had favorable experiences in court would prefer discretion compared to those who felt they were treated unfairly in court. Another change would be to find a similar data set that was collected more recently.

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