The Strange Rebirth of Missile Defense:
Why Republicans Resurrected Reagan’s Dream

Paul Musgrave

Introduction

National missile defense, even in its stripped-down, post-Reagan version, died in 1993. The Clinton administration killed it; shifting funding from research on “Star Wars”-like projects to missile defense systems like the Patriot. Instead of building a shield that would protect all of America, the United States would henceforth try to construct only limited defenses that could protect troops deployed in a future battleground. Yet ten years later, the George W. Bush administration has broken ground on new testing sites for a planned national missile defense, and billions of dollars annually are flowing into research and construction of a nationwide missile shield. The Bush administration could claim, were it so inclined, that it was merely following its predecessors; the basic parts of the Bush system are the same as those President Clinton proposed to use in his national missile defense.

Why did U.S. policy toward missile defenses shift so dramatically? How did National Missile Defense survive its apparent death in 1993?

These questions are important. National missile defense, in all of its guises and architectures, is among the most complex technical challenges humans have ever attempted to solve. It is also among the most costly, with some estimates placing the total cost of a missile defense system at nearly a trillion dollars. Understanding the sources of NMD’s resurrection is critical to a deeper comprehension of American security policy in the early years of the twenty-first century.
The rebirth of missile defense came from two sources. First, a small but vocal group of conservative activists kept alive Reagan’s dream of building a missile shield. Second, the Republican leadership, particularly in Congress, seized upon NMD as a useful political weapon to use against President Clinton. Some critics have adduced another hypothesis, that NMD was the result of the military-industrial-congressional complex, and is little more than a giveaway to defense contractors. Advocates of missile defense, on the other hand, have argued that the system is self-evidently a good idea deserving of congressional support. This paper, however, will argue that a marriage of convenience between Republican political strategists and conservative activists better explains the particulars of the missile defense debate, as well as explaining NMD’s resurrection.

Conservative Ideology and Missile Defense

A thumbnail sketch of conservative ideology would include several key positions. In foreign and security policy, conservatives generally oppose peacekeeping and nation-building missions, like those in Somalia and Haiti, although mainstream conservatives are not isolationists. Typically, conservatives favor military action over diplomacy, and reject multilateral treaties or, indeed, any complex agreement like the SALT and START agreements. While conservatives usually oppose domestic spending on social programs, they support many military programs (like NMD) that the Pentagon would rather not spend money on. For the purposes of determining conservative beliefs on missile defense, I have primarily relied on The National Review, the Weekly Standard, the Heritage Foundation, the Cato Institute, the American Enterprise Institute, the Center for
Security Policy, and the syndicated columns of George Will and William Safire. This list is incomplete, but a more exhaustive search was well beyond the bounds of this paper. Further, these sources reflect a diverse set of conservative beliefs, and as we will see, they endorse at times conflicting theories of the necessity, utility, and feasibility of missile defenses. For convenience, I will normally refer to conservative views as though they were unified; however, when necessary, I will analyze the differences in conservative positions on given facets of national missile defense.

The Conservative Case for Missile Defense

It is a sweeping but useful generalization that conservatives interested in defense and security policy perceive a more threatening world than the average citizen or even the average politically-aware person does. It is impossible to read a selection of conservative literature on international relations or military affairs of any significant size without coming to the conclusion that conservatives see international relations as a Hobbesian state of nature. National security considerations, the state of American armed forces, and the rise of potential competitors to U.S. political and military hegemony occupy a far more prominent place in the conservative assessment of the world than in liberal, Green, or moderate views. This preoccupation with force and threats to America’s physical security occasionally leads some conservatives to bizarre conclusions, such as blaming the People’s Republic of China for the downing of TWA Flight 800. Understanding this threat-centered ideology allows us to learn why, in a time of prosperity, security, and world dominance unlike any the United States had ever known, conservatives agitated for
the deployment of an expensive, untested, and possibly unworkable missile defense system.
The Russian Threat

One threat widely assumed to be defunct during the Clinton administration emerges in some conservative literature as a reason to begin constructing a thick national missile defense. In many conservative articles, op-eds, and books, writers cite the large Russian arsenal of nuclear-tipped ICBMs as a menace to U.S. national security. Thoughtful students of strategic policy on both left and right admit that there is a potential hazard from a Russian accidental launch. Joseph Cirincione, hardly a missile defense advocate, told the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs in February, 2000, that “there is considerable evidence of major problems with Russian command and control systems. The continuing Russian decline could severely weaken current safeguards, increasing the risk of launches in error or missile sales to third countries.”

A number of researchers, including missile defense opponents Ted Postol, George Lewis, and Bruce Blair, wrote in the New England Journal of Medicine of the possible harms of a Russian accidental strike, concluding that “the risk of an accidental nuclear attack has increased in recent years, threatening a public health disaster of unprecedented scale.”

Yet some conservatives see the threat from Russian nuclear weapons as extending beyond an accidental missile launch to encompass the possibility of an adventurist Russian regime using its Soviet-leftover weapons as blackmail against the United States. This scenario does not come from an unknown writer in an obscure journal. It was published in former Reagan Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger’s 1996 book The Next War, which describes the conquest of Europe by a revanchist Russia led by a red-brown coalition. Russian troops occupy all of Europe from the Ukraine to France, using exotic weapons to defeat NATO forces and using tactical nuclear weapons to fry troop
concentrations. In response to Russia’s nuclear strikes, the French launch their
submarine-launched ballistic missiles at Russian troops—but the missiles are intercepted
by a nigh-impenetrable Russian missile defense. Within months, the United States is a
tributary state.iii

The scenario rests on two key assumptions: that missile defense works, and that if
Russia deploys one and the United States doesn’t, Russia will take over the world.
Weinberger and his co-author’s description of the deployment of the Russian missile
defense reflects their estimation of NMD’s importance and its likelihood of success:

General Platonov stood in front of the vehicles with his arm extended, as if
he were demonstrating a new car model in a showroom. “These are the
some of the components for Magic Chain. They are BMD [ballistic
missile defense] launchers, updated mobile versions of Galosh and
Gazelle.” Magic Chain was an advanced and dramatically expanded
version of the BMD system developed by the Soviets beginning in the
1960s [similar to the U.S. Spartan and Sprint interceptors]….“By mass
producing new versions of Galosh and Gazelle,” Platonov said excitedly,
“we can today declare the BMD treaty of 1972 null and void. We are now
in a position to deploy some one thousand launchers and approximately
five thousand interceptor missiles around the country. This will neutralize
any foreign nuclear missile capabilities.”iv

To defeat the Russians, the U.S. presses forward with a crash program to develop a
Brilliant Pebbles (a space-based kinetic-intercept boost-phase system favored by the
George H.W. Bush administration) missile defense.

Leaving aside the obvious objections to Weinberger’s scenario (such as how
bankrupt Russia could afford a defense system that would strain U.S. finances), it is
important to realize that while this scenario is far-fetched, the former defense secretary
was not alone in seeing the risks of a Russian strike. A 1994 National Review article
headlined “Multilateral Madness” criticized President Clinton’s NMD program for
gutting research into space-based defenses and leaving U.S. defenses weak vis-à-vis their
Russian counterparts—a critique with no teeth unless one believes, as the author apparently did, that Russia and the U.S. are once and future enemies. The highly nonpartisan Congressional Research Service wrote in 2001 that “some Members believe that the United States should continue to pursue the development of a missile defense that can protect the United States from a large-scale attack by Russia.” While Russo-American relations might be amicable now, some congressmen argued that “changes in Russian leadership could restore the adversarial relationship between the two nations.” From such assertions, it is not a large jump to conclude some conservatives believe missile defense is essential to defending against potential Russian aggression.

The Chinese Threat

While Russia might pose a threat to American national security in the eyes of some conservatives, many more view the People’s Republic of China as a potential challenger bent on claiming the Soviet Union’s mantle as chief rival to American power. Washington Times defense correspondent Bill Gertz’s The China Threat: How the People’s Republic Targets America (Regnery, 2000) is an accurate summary of hardline conservative thought; the book’s title suggests its tone. In brief, many rightists see the PRC as a strategic threat to the U.S. and believe that without missile defense, America will lose its preeminent position in East Asia. As evidence for this analysis, conservatives offer China’s tough policy on Taiwan, its determination to modernize its nuclear forces, its territorial claims against its neighbors (such as China’s claim on the Spratly Islands), and China’s official Communist ideology.
Conservative suspicion of China runs deep. A 1996 publication of the Center for Security Policy, a think tank headed by former Reagan administration official Frank Gaffney, accused China of supplying SAMs to terrorists who used them to shoot down TWA Flight 800. On a more intellectually serious level, Beijing’s moves to improve its nuclear deterrent loom large in conservative perceptions of the PRC’s intentions. “In perhaps the most benign strategic security environment it has experienced, the PRC is pressing ahead with an ambitious conventional ballistic missile and strategic nuclear force modernization program,” one conservative expert told an audience at the Heritage Foundation in 2000. Beijing’s growing and increasingly more sophisticated nuclear missiles “pose a potential threat to South Korea, Japan, and U.S. forces stationed there. This missile buildup is undermining stability in the region.”

Conservatives argue —probably correctly—that the United States and its allies are the main target of an improved Chinese arsenal. An oft-repeated statement in the conservative media that in 1996 a Chinese official had told an American delegation that the U.S. wouldn’t defend Taiwan because Americans cared more about Los Angeles than Taipei was taken as confirmation of this theory. Whether the story is true, it has taken on a life of its own. Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), serving as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, used the anecdote in a telling statement of conservative ideas on defense policy:

Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord acknowledged that Chinese officials had declared that the United States, quote, "wouldn't dare defend Taiwan because they"—communist China—"would rain nuclear bombs on Los Angeles," end of quote. Now if that's not nuclear blackmail, it will do until nuclear blackmail comes along. It will do while the Clinton administration ties its hands until the first nuclear missile hits the West Coast of the United States. Now, China's ability, don't you see, to hold the United States hostage for such threats is made possible by the fact that a
band of latter day Luddites here in Washington have consistently refused even to consider building the very strategic missile defenses necessary to protect the American people from such an attack. At the heart of this matter, of course, is the perverse logic of the ABM treaty which argues that vulnerability to nuclear tip [sic] ballistic missiles is essential to stability. x

Allegations that Chinese intelligence agencies had penetrated the security at Los Alamos National Laboratories provided more ammunition for Clinton’s critics. Now they had a link between Clinton’s perceived laxity on defense issues and the China threat. “The Cox Report is a long-overdue wake-up call for the Clinton Administration and U.S. allies to reassess China’s intentions,” a Heritage Foundation article said, echoing a refrain common among conservative writers. “China’s use of U.S. technology to improve its missile forces more rapidly now requires that the Clinton Administration commit to an earliest possible deployment of effective national and theater missile defense systems.” xi “Red China, a nation which has just been caught stealing atomic secrets for the nuclear ICBMs with which it has already explicitly threatened our cities, has absolutely no right to complain about U.S. deployment of missile defense,” Senator Helms said in 1999. xii Another Heritage Report urged the construction of sea- and space-based missile defenses to counter potential Chinese advances in missile technology made possible by the PRC’s “thievery.” xiii Conservative reaction to the Cox Report was of a piece with earlier writing on American policy toward the People’s Republic. Throughout the decade, writers pushed for the sale of missile defenses to Taiwan (in addition to other high-technology conventional armaments). xiv Heritage articles had supported a U.S. missile defense system in Asia for years before the Los Alamos story broke: “Unless America responds, China’s future nuclear intimidation could destabilize Asia by driving others in the region to seek their own nuclear deterrent. To avoid this…Washington
should emphasize missile defense cooperation as an effective alternative to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.”

This Sino-centric emphasis on missile defense marked a difference between the Clinton Administration’s and conservatives’ views on NMD’s goals. Peter Brookes, a senior staffer for the House Committee on International Relations, argued that China should be an explicit target of the new NMD system, much as McNamara had defended Sentinel as a “Chinese-oriented” defense:

The great unexamined story today regarding ballistic missile defense (BMD) in Asia is the unspoken effect that actions by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are having on America’s consolidation of its own future missile defenses. The Clinton Administration decries missile programs in Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, but for some inexplicable reason it fears mentioning the “C” word: China…Claiming that missile defense is the product wholly of North Korea and other “rogue” states is disingenuous and the Chinese do not believe it anyway. BMD is directed at missiles, be they Iranian, Iraqi—or Chinese.

The conservative case for missile defense rests in part on perceptions of a Chinese threat that, to non-conservatives, seems at least somewhat exaggerated (although much less exaggerated than claims of a Russian threat). If conservatives believe that China aims to challenge U.S. hegemony through military strength, than their enthusiasm for missile defenses as a counter to Chinese adventurism makes ideological sense.

The Rogue State Threat

While many conservatives posit China and Russia as threats justifying the deployment of a missile defense, all conservatives and many non-conservatives agree that “rogue states” (traditionally Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Libya, although Syria and Cuba are sometimes included) are a danger to U.S. national security. The conservative
rationale for missile defense rests in large part on the belief that rogue states’ leaders are unstable and irrational. If a rogue state’s leader is irrational, the argument continues, than the uber-rational argument of mutually assured destruction no longer holds. While conservatives mainly reject MAD as a suitable doctrine for U.S. security, they are unanimous in their contention that Saddam, Qaddafi, and Kim Jong-Il might use nuclear weapons to blackmail the U.S. The right-wing argument that rogue states pose a strategic threat to American interests depends on two theories: first, that rogue states can and will develop ballistic missile programs; and second, that only missile defense can defend the United States against nuclear-armed tyrants.

That ballistic missile proliferation is inevitable is a staple of conservative rhetoric. Congressman Duncan Hunter (R, CA), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Military Procurement, wrote a strident article in National Review in 1995 arguing that rogue states would indeed seek ballistic missiles despite their expense: “Missiles are cheaper to purchase and operate than modern combat aircraft. And, unlike conventional bombing attacks, missile strikes cannot be intercepted by fighters or standard anti-aircraft weapons. …Absent an effective defense, even crude weapons can thus be very useful.” Longtime missile defense advocate Angelo Codevilla wrote in Commentary that ballistic missiles, especially the non-nuclear variety but increasingly the nuclear as well, are more and more frequently the fruit of ordinary technology…The internationalization of graduate study in the sciences, and computer-aided design and manufacturing, allow any government to acquire world-class talent and equipment….So whoever wants missiles is likely to get them, and whoever wants to use them probably will.

Throughout the period 1995-1998, one encounters arguments like Hunter’s and Codevilla’s frequently in the conservative media.
In July 1998, a special congressional commission appointed by the Republican-dominated House added its authority to charges that the Clinton administration was vastly understating the risk of a rogue state obtaining missiles capable of striking American soil. Known as the Rumsfeld Commission after its chairman, then-former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the commission concluded that rogue states could likely deploy missiles capable of hitting American targets with “little or no warning.” The Rumsfeld Commission’s findings, released on July 15, contradicted a 1995 CIA estimate stating that the U.S. would likely face no such threat before 2010, and would have years of warning before any deployment.\textsuperscript{xix} Undaunted, the CIA and the Clinton administration stood by their earlier estimates. Six weeks later, on August 31 North Korea tested its three-stage Taepo-Dong 1 ICBM, sending the missile over the Japanese Home Islands and surprising intelligence community analyst.\textsuperscript{xx} The August 31 test dramatically underscored the Rumsfeld Commission’s conclusions and became a milestone in missile defense development, spurring conservatives and congressional Republicans to action even as it undercut the Clinton administration’s go-slow approach.

North Korea’s test also appeared to confirm the conservatives belief that if a rogue state acquired weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, their use would be a foregone conclusion. Staunch pro-NMD Congressman Curt Weldon (R-PA) said in 2000 that ballistic missiles were “the weapon of choice for rogue nations and terrorist groups.”\textsuperscript{xxi} Former Nixon speechwriter and \textit{New York Times} columnist William Safire laid out conservative fears succinctly in a column written five days after the Rumsfeld Commission’s report:

\textbf{Imagine you are the next U.S. President and this crisis arises:}
The starving army of North Korea launches an attack on South Korea imperiling our 30,000 troops. You threaten massive air assault; Pyongyang counterthreatens to put a nuclear missile into Hawaii. You say that would cause you to obliterate North Korea; its undeterred leaders dare you to make the trade. Decide.

Or this crisis: Saddam Hussein invades Saudi Arabia. You warn of Desert Storm II; he says he has a weapon of mass destruction on a ship near the U.S. and is ready to sacrifice Baghdad if you are ready to lose New York. Decide.

Or this: China, not now a rogue state, goes into an internal convulsion and an irrational warlord attacks Taiwan. You threaten to intervene; within 10 minutes, ICBM’s are targeted on all major U.S. cities. Decide.

Before you do, remember this: In 1998, the C.I.A. told your predecessor that it was highly unlikely that any rogue state “except possibly North Korea” would have a nuclear weapon capable of hitting any of the “contiguous 48 states” within 10 to 12 years. (That’s some exception; apparently our strategic assessors are untroubled at the prospect of losing Pearl Harbor again.)

You have no missile defense in place. The C.I.A. assured your predecessor you would have five years’ warning about other nations’ weapons development before you would have to deploy a missile defense.xxi

Fears of succumbing to nuclear blackmail or watching a future Persian Gulf War result in the destruction of New York City understandably prey on the minds of conservative legislators, analysts, and commentators. But why do these fears dominate conservative discussions to such a large extent? The answer lies in the conservative worldview, which is fundamentally different from liberal or moderate counterparts.

**Mundus Horrendus: The Conservative Paradigm**

The world through conservatives’ eyes is a nasty, brutish place. This explains the right-wing emphasis on defense policy during a period when threats to American security were at their lowest ebb in seventy-five years, before the Japanese invasion of
Manchuria. Most observers, looking at Russia, saw the potential for democratic and
capitalist reform; conservatives saw a potential Soviet phoenix. President Clinton
declared China a “strategic partner” to the United States; conservatives read books and
articles describing how China was plotting to overthrow U.S. hegemony. To many
conservatives, the idea that rogue states could create the massive infrastructure necessary
to develop workable strategic weapons systems is not only plausible, but an unassailable
truth. xxiii

The last and most important element of this conservative paradigm is the belief
that only force can meet force. To a conservative, diplomacy is ineffectual, and those
who promote diplomatic solutions are cowards. John Miller, a writer in National Review,
wrote in 1999 that “the very idea [of missile defense] is anathema to many of those
presently in charge of American national security. Test bans and international
monitoring, they think, will keep the United States safe.” xxxiv Jesse Helms expressed a
typical conservative reaction to a reliance on international law and negotiations in a
Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing: “Sam Ervin used to laugh as he told about
Will Rogers—and everybody here is not old enough to remember Will Rogers, who was
probably the most popular American entertainer. He used to say at that time that the
United States never lost a war or won a treaty. And that was about right.” xxxv

Many Clinton-era treaties drew conservative fire. Conservatives condemned the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Kyoto global warming treaty, START II, the
Chemical Weapons Convention, and many more for tying America’s hands instead of
serving America’s interests. xxvi The treaty that raised the most conservative ire was the
1972 ABM Treaty, negotiated and signed by the Nixon administration as a stepping-stone
to the SALT agreements. From 1995 onward, the Heritage Foundation put out a steady stream of articles arguing in favor of junking the ABM Treaty, and the theme was picked up by many other conservative commentators and legislators as well (see note for partial list). National Review termed the Clinton administration “arms control freaks” for their support of the ABM Treaty. Helms blasted the “Clinton-Gore administration” for having “squandered” time working with Russia on potential amendments to the ABM agreement that the Clinton administration said would allow the U.S. to proceed with the deployment of a missile defense. Ever tactful, Helms charged the president with “spend[ing] his time in various dalliances, some well known, some not, not the least of which has been his love affair with the ABM Treaty.”

Ad hominems aside, the most frequently-raised conservative argument against the ABM Treaty was that since it had been signed by the Soviet Union, and since the Soviet Union no longer existed, the treaty was no longer in force. Critics charged that if the President had his way and the treaty remained in force, “America quite possibly will be condemned to remain permanently vulnerable to missile attack.” Since the ABM Treaty prevented the U.S. from deploying a national missile defense with more than 100 interceptors except in Grand Forks or Washington, D.C., conservatives had to discredit the treaty to make progress on their goal of building a missile shield. Even in the face of severe objections from Russian, Chinese, and European governments, conservatives within and without Congress pressed for either a presidential declaration that the ABM Treaty was no longer in force or an invocation of the treaty’s “supreme national interests” clause, which would allow the U.S. to withdraw from the treaty in six months.
The conservative view that problems of global security cannot be solved through negotiations is a logical precursor to the conservative enthusiasm for national missile defense. If one perceives a mundus horrendus in which rogue states will easily elude inspection regimes and acquire weapons of mass destruction, Russia could at any moment end its democratic conversion and attempt to conquer Europe, and China schemes to end American influence in East Asia, one naturally has little faith in treaties. Where, then, to turn for security? Confronted with such threats, missile defense becomes a tempting policy.

**Missile Defense and the Conservative Quest for Total Security**

Having established that conservatives see the world as a fearful place in which diplomacy will always fail, it should not be surprising that they have turned to missile defense to guarantee American interests. Conservatives’ desire to deploy a missile shield, however, springs equally from another source: the conservative quest to establish total security for the United States and its troops. This attitude animates mainstream conservatives’ approach to all questions of military and security policy. It explains why parchment barriers like the ABM Treaty are unsatisfying to conservatives. Treaties, being based upon mutual agreement, inherently place some measure of American security in the hands of another state’s leaders. This is unacceptable to conservatives who believe that the United States occupies a privileged place in the international system. While some commentators have criticized this view (notably Henry Kissinger in *Diplomacy*), it nevertheless is essential to conservative views on defense. Consider the critique of the
proposed Clinton administration’s NMD system by prolific Heritage Foundation analyst Baker Spring:

Despite appearances, the Administration’s new agreement with Russia will shortchange, not enhance, missile defense for America. Its shortcomings are significant: ...It would not allow the United States to deploy a missile defense system that would protect all U.S. territory. A single-site system—whether located in North Dakota, Alaska, or Washington, D.C.—is simply too limited to provide an effective territorial defense against ballistic missiles. *It could not, for example, defend against every missile launched from boats in international waters off the coast of the United States.* [Emphasis added.]

Spring’s words (“every missile”) make little sense to any audience but one convinced that a perfect defense of the United States is technically possible and fiscally feasible.

A conservative audience is especially likely to consider the technological challenges of NMD as mere engineering difficulties, not nearly insurmountable. Missile defense advocates are unanimous in stating publicly that the United States’ lack of an ABM system is a political, not a scientific or a technical, failure. Former SDI director Henry Cooper told the *Wall Street Journal* in June, 1996, that “Defending against [ballistic missile attack] has been possible for years, but the necessary political will has been missing.” Senator Thad Cochrane (R-MS), a notable figure in the missile defense fights in Congress, told *The Christian Science Monitor* “We have a clear threat to our security that we have the technology to defend against but, so far, not the will.”[xxxiv] In his scenario in which Russia conquers Europe, Weinberger and his coauthor have a senior White House official tell American missile defense scientists that “The failure to develop and deploy a strategic defense system was a political—not scientific—blunder. And in retrospect, it was on a magnitude I have never seen before. We are in this predicament because years ago Washington failed to realize this threat was present.”[xxxv] The most
extreme manifestation of this belief yields truly unrealistic policy proposals, such as Spring’s statement in 1999 that “A streamlined management approach such as that used to develop the Polaris system would enable the military to meet whatever deadline Congress established.”

In their proclamations of faith in American technology, NMD proponents echo the most forceful believer in an impenetrable missile shield, Ronald Reagan. The former president’s vision infuses conservative rhetoric on the subject. Sanford Lakoff and Herbert York had noticed the political maneuvering over Reagan’s missile defense legacy as early as 1989:

This political rationale [that the West should take the offensive in the Cold War] greatly appeals to hard-core conservatives and to a broader public attuned to the same sentiments. Adherence to the SDI has thus become a litmus test of personal loyalty not only to the president but also to his legacy. Aspirants to the Reagan mantle, like Jack Kemp and Dan Quayle, have pledged to maintain SDI as a token of their commitment to the conservative agenda, along with tax reduction and militant anticommunism.

As Jonathan Chait noted in a 2000 New Republic article on Reagan’s legacy in the Republican Party, “to associate an idea with Reagan is axiomatically to establish its truth.” Chait’s observation has been amply borne out in personal conversations with mainstream conservatives, observation of Republican conversations, and employment in a Republican senator’s Washington office. Conservative author Dinesh D’Souza has said that the litmus test for all issues of public policy should be simply to ask the question: “What would Reagan have done?” The link between Reagan and missile defense is particularly strong. Few conservatives writing on the subject miss an opportunity to pay homage to Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative. “The center of gravity in the old ‘Star Wars’ debate has moved,” William Safire wrote in the New York Times in 1998. “Ronald
Reagan turns out not to have been deranged on defense—only ahead of his time.” xl
Reagan’s UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick said in 1999 that American “moral strength should enable us to face squarely the dangers of proliferation. And that realism should lead us at last to build and deploy the defensive system begun—a full decade and a half ago—by Ronald Reagan.” xli Similar comments abound. Missile defense has been associated with Reagan, and for conservatives at least, its truth has been established.

Like Reagan, conservative proponents of an ABM system are optimistic about the system’s chances for success. Confidence in the system’s feasibility, the certainty that some nation will threaten the United States with long-range missiles, and the belief that delays in the system’s deployment are symptoms of a failure of political will leads conservatives to a conclusion they find most agreeable: that the Clinton administration either was too blind to see the benefits of missile defense or too politically craven to admit them. This topic will be discussed further below. For true-believing conservatives, however, let it suffice to say for the moment that Clinton was in many respects the anti-Reagan, and Clinton’s grudging acceptance of a limited missile defense was almost as great a sin as his administration’s oft-repeated statement that the ABM Treaty was the cornerstone of strategic stability in the Russo-American relationship.

The evidence presented so far has made the best case that conservative ideology was the driving force behind congressional Republicans’ and conservative activists’ push for the deployment of a national missile defense in the Clinton administration. But the hypothesis is unsupportable. Conservative ideology set the parameters for the intraparty debate over missile defense and colored conservative rhetoric on the issue, but did not itself spark the movement for an ABM system’s development. After Defense Secretary
Les Aspin’s announcement early in the Clinton administration that the SDI office would be renamed the Ballistic Missile Defense Office and its focus shifted from NMD to theater missile defenses (TMD), *National Review* commented bitterly that “SDI died a quiet death. The GOP’s silence was deafening…Few congressional Republicans rose to challenge the decision, or to point out the challenge it poses for the future of American national security.” Similarly, one searches in vain for a broad pro-NMD movement in 1993 and 1994. While Frank Gaffney’s Center for Security Policy and the High Frontier groups both pressed for an ABM system, more mainstream conservative groups ignored the issue. In articles on North Korea’s nuclear program in 1993 and 1994, the Heritage Foundation recommended that the Clinton administration negotiate with Pyongyang, even stating that a proper goal of those negotiations was persuading the North Koreans to let the International Atomic Energy Agency begin inspections. Missile defense was not mentioned at all. By contrast, later in the decade, Heritage experts prescribed missile defense as a panacea for all security ailments. And as we have seen, the threat of North Korean nuclear-tipped missiles was one of the main justifications for the construction of a missile shield.

What prompted this change? The chronology is telling. Before the “Republican Revolution” in which both House and Senate passed into Republican control, conservatives were largely quiet on the missile defense issue. Afterwards, conservatives were vehement in their calls for the system’s immediate deployment. If ideology were the prime motivating factor behind these calls, then we would not expect conservatives to be so dramatically affected by political fortunes. Indeed, the timing suggests that missile defense was a political issue, a subject discussed in the next section.
The Republican Political Case for Missile Defense

Politicians, those who practice politics as a vocation, must seek to maintain their hold on power. That means that they cannot be guided solely by a minority ideology for long in a democratic system. Yet they can use issues popular with a minority group in order to win elections on a larger scale. In the case of missile defense, it appears from the evidence available in the public record that Republican congressional leaders planned to use NMD as a political weapon against President Clinton. This theory explains much of Republican behavior during the period after the midterm elections of 1994 (the “Republican Revolution”), including the uneven progress of missile defense and the numerous reversals NMD suffered in Congress during the latter years of the Clinton administration. It also provides a possible explanation why the leadership was willing to countenance massively increased spending in the face of continuing federal deficits, an ideological conflict which forced adherents to a balanced budget into an alliance with the Democratic minority at two critical points in the first congressional term following the Revolution. As compelling as the theory is in many respects, though, it fails to conclusively prove its central thesis: that Republicans in Congress supported NMD for no other reason than because they thought it was a political weapon which could win votes from the Democratic side of the aisle.

Missile Defense and the Revolution

The 1994 midterm elections saw the Republican Party win control of both houses of Congress for the first time since Eisenhower was in office. Republicans won fifty-
seven House seats and eight Senate seats formerly held by Democrats in the election.\textsuperscript{xlv}

While the Senate had seen occasional periods of Republican leadership in the intervening decades, the House had been Democrat-controlled for forty years. The media labeled this signal victory the “Republican Revolution” and ascribed the power shift to popular dislike of President Clinton brought on by Clinton’s failures during his first two years in office. Republicans channeled these anti-Clinton feelings into support for GOP candidates by nationalizing the party’s message in the congressional elections. The “Contract With America,” a platform signed by nearly every successful Republican congressional candidate, promised action on ten key issues within the first hundred days of a Republican Congress.\textsuperscript{xlv} At the time, the Contract was seen as a key part of the Republican strategy, and the incoming leadership—particularly the Contract’s author, then-Minority Whip and Speaker-apparent Newt Gingrich—took seriously the party’s pledge to bring Contract items to a vote. One of these items, the National Security Restoration Act, included provisions demanding “deployment at the earliest possible date” of a national missile defense system.\textsuperscript{xlvi}

Reaction to the Contract was less than Republicans could have hoped for. Conservatives were satisfied with the plan. The Center for Security Policy crowed over the Contract’s inclusion of NMD, calling the platform’s promise to build an ABM system the candidates’ “most important pledge.”\textsuperscript{xlvii} Editorial writers nationwide were more critical. The \textit{St. Louis Post-Dispatch} wrote in a typical response that one of the Contract’s many “retreads” was “reviving the Star Wars missile defense, though for what purpose one is left to guess.”\textsuperscript{xlviii} The \textit{Denver Rocky Mountain News} editorialized that even though the United States faced nuclear threats in the post-Cold War era, “it isn’t
obvious that America should spend many billions immediately to mount a Star Wars
defense.” And the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, generally supportive of the
Republican critique that the Clinton defense budget was too small, argued that “it would
be ludicrous to spend hundreds of billions of dollars to guard against such puny ‘threats’
[like North Korea or Libya]. The money could, and should, be spent much more
wisely.”

Disregarding criticism, the Republican leadership pressed forward with its
legislative agenda. Their immediate goal was to reverse the Clinton administration’s
1993 decision to focus on theater missile defenses (TMD) that would offer protection
against Scuds and other short-range missiles. In typically understated rhetoric, Gingrich
told a symposium held in April, 1995, at the conservative Hoover Foundation that while
conservatives had “mishandled” the issue of missile defenses, NMD still promised
political gains and was, in any case, a moral imperative. “[W]e have not put the moral
burden on the Left of saying…that they are literally prepared to risk the annihilation of
millions of Americans rather than make a modest investment in blocking dictatorships
that have values that are extraordinarily hostile to our civilization,” Gingrich said. “The
key political message is: ‘The world is dangerous, we do have the potential to protect
American lives. Some people are willing to let you die or let you be totally blackmailed.
Which team do you want to be on? Everything beyond that is overly complex.’

Gingrich’s remarks reveal the key point of the Republican message. Republicans
planned to mount an attack on Clinton similar to Kennedy’s claim that Eisenhower and
the Republicans had allowed the Soviets to outstrip the United States in the construction
of ICBMs—the infamous “missile gap.” The ploy had helped the Massachusetts senator
defeat Nixon. Thirty-five years later, the question was not offenses, but defenses. While Republican presidents had pushed for the construction of a defensive shield guarding American lives, the argument ran, Clinton had halted ABM research and indeed made vulnerability to nuclear assault one of the cornerstones of his strategic policy. This ploy, Gingrich and others believed, could help turn Clinton into a one-term president.

Gingrich’s speech and other Republican and conservative statements from this period repeat this theme of vulnerability ad nauseam. As one Heritage Foundation analyst wrote, “Why does the Administration believe that America should be vulnerable to ballistic missile attack? Why does this Administration want to defend U.S. allies and forces overseas but leave American citizens and territory vulnerable to nuclear attack?”

If Republicans could “own” the missile defense issue, the political rewards could be enormous. But to make missile defense a political issue, it would not be enough for the GOP to support NMD. To use a simple but instructive metaphor: If everyone loves apple pie, then apple pie isn’t a voting issue. If a politician can persuade the public that his opponent not only hates apple pie, but plans to confiscate every American’s apple pie and replace it with something un-American (black bread and sausage, say, or escargot), then he can “own” the apple pie issue and use it to win election. Therefore, the Republican leadership needed a dramatic confrontation to prove to the voting public that Clinton opposed NMD. The GOP also needed to convince the electorate that NMD was necessary, and that Congress had a workable plan. To succeed, therefore, the leadership would have to create a plan acceptable to the public and to the large group of highly ideological freshmen Republican congressmen firmly committed to their political ideals and unconcerned with compromise.
Despite holding a commanding majority in both houses of Congress, the leadership was unable to achieve its aims. The first hints of trouble came early in the 104\textsuperscript{th} Congress. Republican legislation would have doubled Clinton’s spending on NMD to $15 billion over five years, and the chairman of the House Appropriations Committee was strongly in favor of missile defenses.\textsuperscript{liii} Once the bill left committee, where the leadership held firm control, the fate of missile defense was less sure. Even though House rules are restrictive and give the majority party’s leadership ample tools to protect favored legislation, there is always the possibility of a backbenchers’ revolt that can upset the plans of the Speaker and his lieutenants. In February 1995, the Republican leadership was stunned as a Democratic amendment placing NMD at a lower priority than TMD and combat-readiness of conventional troops passed 218-212. Two dozen Republicans crossed party lines to vote for the amendment, joining nearly every Democrat in the House (although one, Budget Committee chairman John Kasich of Ohio, later said that he was confused and that his vote for the amendment was a mistake).\textsuperscript{liv}

Still the leadership pressed on. In June, NMD passed a crucial test as the House added more than half a billion dollars for national missile defense to the Pentagon’s proposed budget.\textsuperscript{lv} The House defeated a Democratic amendment that would have redirected the $628 million to housing allowances for soldiers, allowing as many as 15,000 military families to forego food stamps.\textsuperscript{lvi} The Senate passed similar measures, and by December, the Republican leadership had a defense budget that would have heralded the rebirth of missile defense as a defense priority. The winter of 1995-1996 was not remembered in political circles for missile defense, however. Rather, during those months, disputes between Congress and the White House over the size and
priorities of the federal budget resulted in what observers called a “train wreck.” Without a budget, the Treasury couldn’t pay its bills, and so the government (or at least its “nonessential personnel”) shut down. One of the casualties of the budget battles was missile defense. President Clinton vetoed the Republican defense budget and its funding for NMD. Clinton justified his actions by saying the anti-missile system would waste billions of dollars and jeopardize decades-long arms control efforts. Another defense bill was passed—but this one lacked the increased funding for NMD Republicans had sought.

**Missile Defense and the Presidential Campaign of 1996**

Missile defense returned months later to the floor of the House and Senate. In the intervening months, Majority Leader Bob Dole of Kansas had secured the Republican presidential nomination in a bruising primary. Dole’s presidential campaign led the longtime legislator to resign his seat in June, but before his formal farewell, the leadership tried to tie Congress’s agenda to the goal of unseating Clinton. Missile defense was one of the legislative initiatives that the leadership believed could highlight the differences between the senator and the president.

Conservatives believed that Clinton would never accept a missile defense. They interpreted Clinton’s veto of the defense budget in December as a signal that he would cling to treaties instead of proposing a missile defense of his own. Columnist George Will summed up this attitude when he wrote that Dole

must define his campaign by boldness…The issue of ballistic missile defense is ripe, and suited to stinging rhetoric—something like this: ‘For his own security, Bill Clinton has Pennsylvania Avenue barricaded, making the heart of our nation’s capital resemble the bunker of a Third
World ruler living in fear. The day I take office, presidential cowering will end and national security leadership will resume: Pennsylvania Avenue will be reopened and the nation will begin deployment of missile defense.\textsuperscript{lviii}

While Dole never expressed himself in Will’s exact words, the Kansan used similar phrases while out on the hustings. “From Libya to Iraq to Iran to North Korea and elsewhere, a rogues’ gallery of terrorists and aggressive anti-American regimes I believe are in effect being encouraged by the administration’s attitude. In the face of that fact, Mr. Clinton’s opposition to a missile defense is one of the most negligent, short-sighted, irresponsible and potentially catastrophic policies in history,” Dole said in a June stump speech in California.\textsuperscript{lix}

But by October, missile defense had all but disappeared from Dole’s campaign speeches. Two events and an unforeseen complication had forced the candidate to give up on a theme which many Republicans had thought could help the erstwhile senator capture the White House. First, in early June, Senate Republicans under Dole’s leadership failed to break a Democratic filibuster on the Defend America Act, which Democrats called “Dole’s Star Wars bill.” The act would have required the construction of an ABM shield as soon as technologically feasible possible. One Democratic aide promised that “the senator’s last week here is going to be a loser, no matter how you look at it.”\textsuperscript{lx} A companion bill introduced in the House also failed, as the Republican leadership was forced to withdraw the bill after a Congressional Budget Office estimate put the cost of a missile shield at $60 billion, not the $5 billion claimed by the bill’s proponents.\textsuperscript{lxi}

In the meantime, President Clinton announced his own missile defense program, which would feature three years of research, followed by a decision on deployment. If
the decision was made to deploy, then within three years a shield would be built.

Clinton’s embrace of the “3+3” plan was a surprise. In his 1996 campaign book, *Between Hope and History*, the president had spent only a paragraph on missile defense systems, writing little more than a skeleton draft of “3+3”. In contrast, anti-terrorism legislation and initiatives received five pages’ worth of discussion.\textsuperscript{lxii}

Neither the Republican offensive nor Clinton’s strategic retreat on missile defense may have made a difference politically. To return to the earlier example, in this case it appears as though the electorate not only had no preference between Dole’s and Clinton’s apple pies, but that voters didn’t know that the two candidates had baked. Polls taken during the campaign suggested that few voters cared about defense issues. Education, health care, and crime were more important than readiness and nonproliferation.

*Washington Post* reporter Bradley Graham attended one Republican focus group during the 1996 campaign and reported that NMD wouldn’t be a campaign issue because of voter ignorance:

The 12 men and women seated around a conference table in this Detroit suburb one evening earlier this month were incredulous when told the United States lacked a system for guarding the country against ballistic missile attack.

"I don't believe you, you couldn't pay me enough to believe you," said Michael, a 25-year-old automotive engineer who, like the others, had come at the invitation of a conservative polling group to discuss national security issues. After all, he added, "you see it in the movies."

And not only in the movies. Kathy, a mother of four who runs a day-care center out of her house, and Irene, a single woman who works with the handicapped, recalled watching television images of Iraqi Scud missiles being shot out of the sky by U.S. Patriot interceptors during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Even if the United States would not publicly acknowledge the existence of a national system to protect the home front, Irene said, "Who's to say we really don't have a secret one?"
Apathy and ignorance made NMD a less than attractive issue politically. “I’m reluctant to make it an issue because of the education effort required to make it stick with the electorate,” one Republican congressional candidate challenging a Democratic incumbent told Graham. Ironically, one expert said that when voters expressed an interest in defense at all, “people see terrorism, not ballistic missiles, as the problem.”

**Analysis of 1995 and 1996**

The events of 1995 and 1996 offer an interesting test of the hypothesis being proposed in this chapter. If political considerations were the predominant factor in the missile defense debate, then one would expect that if the issue failed to gain political traction, it would be tossed aside. Such was the case with missile defense. Throughout 1995, Republican congressional leaders sought to distinguish the GOP’s position on missile defense from President Clinton’s, a task accomplished by the latter’s veto. In early 1996, the offensive was renewed, and missile defense bills were again introduced in the House and Senate. While one may criticize Gingrich and Dole for clumsy handling of what they intended to be a showcase piece of legislation, the public record lends support to the political hypothesis. But after the summer of 1996, NMD fell from prominence in the Dole campaign’s rhetoric, and the issue played no part in determining the election’s outcome. Again, this is predicted by the political hypothesis: Clinton had preempted the GOP’s position on missile defense, and voters didn’t care about defense anyway. Therefore, the Dole campaign should have left missile defense behind as a campaign issue—which is what the campaign did in the end.
In contrast, other explanations would predict different behaviors. A purely ideological leadership would press on regardless of political consequences (as happened with the impeachment trial), while a Congress corrupted by the military-industrial complex would be relatively unaffected by political events (consider the history of the F-22). A missile defense program supported by good-government types would probably have had to fight for a place on the agenda, which is controlled by the majority leadership in each chamber. But as we have seen, NMD had little problem being placed on the House and Senate calendars, although it frequently ran into problems once on the floor. Thus, the political hypothesis succeeds in explaining the events of 1995 and 1996 more satisfactorily than the alternatives.

**Missile Defense in Clinton’s Second Term**

What of the later years? As we will see, Clinton’s second term saw the construction of a missile defense move from a topic of debate to a virtual certainty. The basic political calculation for the Republicans remained the same, but it appears that the leadership (with Mississippi Senator Trent Lott replacing Dole as Majority Leader) made a decision to focus on public education instead of immediate action. From that decision was born the first Rumsfeld Commission, a political tool designed to bolster the Republican argument for missile defenses while spotlighting the threat of ballistic missile proliferation. Other events, notably allegations of spying at Los Alamos National Laboratories and North Korea’s test of a first-generation ICBM, gave Republicans in Congress ammunition to use against a president they claimed was still weak on defense. Yet the story of missile defense in Clinton’s second term is, in the end, identical in every
significant political respect to the history of missile defense in 1995 and 1996. As in the 104th Congress, in the 105th and 106th Republicans attacked Clinton’s position on missile defense. White House in turn launched a counterattack that put the issue to rest politically while shifting policy rightward. Thus, by the summer of 2000, President Clinton found himself considering whether to begin building an NMD system seven years after his defense secretary had declared Star Wars dead.

The national media paid less attention to the debate in 1997 than in any other year after the Republican Revolution. There was good reason for this: During 1997, little happened on the missile defense front. In 1998, however, the issue returned to the national stage after the July, 1998, release of the Rumsfeld Commission’s report. (For a description of the Rumsfeld Commission’s findings, see Chapter 3.) The launch of a North Korean Taepo-Dong 1 ICBM into the Sea of Japan in August gave the GOP what its leaders saw as a golden political opportunity. A bill introduced earlier that year by Mississippi’s junior senator, Thad Cochrane, had been withdrawn following another successful Democratic filibuster in May. Within days, the Cochrane bill was back on the Senate’s agenda. Cochrane’s legislation was an attempt to require the U.S. to deploy a missile shield as soon as technologically feasible—a goal of earlier failed Republican bills. The moment passed. Senate Democrats lined up exactly as before to vote down efforts to close debate on the Cochrane bill. The legislation was stuck in a thicket of senatorial procedures. The 105th Congress closed without further major action on NMD.

Support for missile defense in the 106th Congress came from a surprising source. In January 1999, Clinton’s Secretary of Defense William Cohen announced that the White House would seek additional funding for missile defense. Cohen’s announcement
followed an October 1998 budget agreement between the White House and Congress which had pledged a modest increase in NMD spending. Then, in March, 1999, Clinton unexpectedly lifted his objections to Cochrane’s bill, reintroduced in the new Congress as the Missile Defense Act. The White House explained the shift as a result of the adoption of two amendments sought by Democrats, one which asserted that the bill would not jeopardize Russo-American arms reduction treaties and another which pledged that the U.S. would not deploy an untested system. With the amendments, the bill passed the Senate by a vote of 97-3. The House passed the bill by overwhelming margins in May. Only one Republican, Representative Vernon J. Ehlers of Michigan, voted “nay” on the House measure. Ehlers, a physicist, said that he could not vote for something so expensive yet ineffectual.

Besides the public explanation, another motive may explain Clinton’s switch on the Cochrane bill. The issue of Chinese-sponsored espionage at American nuclear weapons laboratories was beginning to crimp Clinton’s post-impeachment popularity. Supporting missile defense was a way for Clinton to show his critics that he was able, as Molly Ivins would say, to “git tuff” on defense issues. Indeed, contemporary sources pointed to the Wen Ho Lee case and the accompanying Republican attacks (such as the highly partisan Cox Report) as the impetus for the White House’s sudden faith in missile defenses. The pattern from Clinton’s reelection campaign was repeating itself: faced with a potential political threat from Republicans on defense issues, Clinton put forward his own proposal that countered the threat even while it contradicted his previous statements and flew against the mainstream of thought in the Democratic Party. The result of this strategy was political victory, but a capitulation on policy. Clinton
preserved his popularity, but the United States was now officially committed to the
construction of a missile defense.

**Conclusion**

The political hypothesis by itself explains many aspects of the missile defense
debate in Congress during the Clinton administration. It explains, for example, why
missile defense efforts were never persistent in the way that efforts to reform campaign
finance laws were. Instead, missile defense legislation was taken up by the Republican-
controlled chambers only when the political timing appeared auspicious. In 1995 and
1996, Republicans in Congress used missile defense to paint President Clinton as a
traditional liberal who was soft on defense. The ebb and flow of missile defense
legislation in 1996 is especially obviously connected to the fortunes of the Dole
presidential campaign. In later years, NMD was again yoked to Republican political
needs. During the 2000 presidential campaign, not studied here, Texas Governor George
W. Bush used his pledge to build a missile shield against Vice President Al Gore,
exploiting Gore’s weakness in opinion polls on defense issues (a traditional Republican
tactic). Conversely, missile defense was shelved when the issue appeared to have little
political traction, as in late 1996 and most of 1997. President Clinton, a canny politician
himself, recognized the Republicans’ strategy, and in a brilliant display of political
maneuvering, managed to neutralize missile defense as a campaign issue, even while his
administration sought to delay the deployment of an ABM system.

While the political hypothesis is more successful than other theories at explaining
the fall and rise of missile defense, it still leaves important questions unanswered, and
thus fails as a monocausal explanation for the rebirth of missile defense under Clinton.
Why did Republicans in Congress promote certain NMD architectures (especially sea- and space-based) over others? And why did Republicans choose missile defense as a tool with which to attack the Clinton administration? It is only when we consider these questions in conjunction with the ideological analysis advanced in the first half of this paper that the answers become clear. Paul Krugman has written of a particular class of Washington insider, the “policy entrepreneur,” who peddles new programs to legislators and others inside the Beltway for their political gain. Conservative activists like Frank Gaffney were able to persuade Republican leaders like Newt Gingrich of the policy and political advantages of a missile defense system. Of course, it wasn’t a hard sell, since most Republican leaders (and especially Gingrich) were predisposed to favor conservative policies anyway.

The synthesis of the two hypotheses discussed separately above best explains the public history of missile defense. The on-again, off-again history of NMD efforts in Congress points toward an opportunistic political strategy. The choice of missile defense over some other policy demonstrates the power of the long-term advocacy of a few niche groups coupled with the general conservative belief that the world is a dangerous place that must be subdued through force. The synthesis even allows us to draw deeper lessons: Politically, missile defense was a flop for the Republicans. In 1996, Dole pushed for NMD, and lost; in 1998, Republicans lost seats in Congress; and in 2000, Bush pushed for NMD and lost the popular vote, eking out a win. But the conservative activists won their battle once even President Clinton publicly supported missile defense. In the long term, then, it almost appears as though the rebirth of missile defense might be
due to a parasitic—perhaps even viral—relationship between conservative ideologues and professional Republicans.
References


iv. Weinberger and Schweizer, 222 and 224.


vii. Gertz is a prolific writer of books espousing hardline conservative viewpoints on foreign and defense policy. See, for example, his 1999 Betrayal: How the Clinton Administration Undermined American Security, also published by Regnery.


x. “Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,” 26 September 1996, eMediaMillWorks, Inc. LEXIS-NEXIS.


xii. “Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,” 26 May 1999, eMediaMillWorks, Inc. LEXIS-NEXIS.


xvi. Brookes, op cit. As an important aside, Brookes’s career illuminates a conservative think tank staffer’s career path. When he spoke at the Heritage Foundation in August 2000, he was Principal Adviser for East Asian Affairs with the majority staff of the House Committee on International Relations, and had already worked in the CIA. He served with the George W. Bush administration as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs for more than a year before taking a job with the Heritage Foundation as Director of its Asian Studies Center. “Peter Brookes,” Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/About/Staff/PeterBrookes.cfm, Last viewed 20 February 2003.


xxiii. A good conservative rejoinder to this criticism would be to point to North Korea’s test. A good response to that argument is to point out that the August test failed and has yet to be repeated, nor has Libya, Iran, or Iraq made significant progress toward the development of intercontinental missiles.


xxv. “Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,” 16 September 1999, eMediaMillWorks, Inc., LEXIS-NEXIS.


xxix. Ibid.


xxxii. George W. Bush took the latter course when he pulled out of the treaty in 2002. Surprisingly, this means that Bush chose a more moderate approach than many conservatives would have liked.


xxxv. Weinberger and Schweizer, 264.


xxxix. Quoted in Chait, “Still His Party.”


xlvi. The Contract is available online at http://www.newt.org/clientuploads/contractwithamerica.pdf.


lxiv. Based upon author’s evaluation of Lexis-Nexis “Major Papers” database.


lxvi. Eric Schmitt, “Republican Missile Defense Bill Loses by One Vote in the Senate,” *New York Times*, 10 September 1998, Lexis-Nexis. Lieberman, Hollings, Inouye, and Akaka voted “aye” again. During the floor debate, Oklahoma Senator James M. Inhofe, a Republican, urged his colleagues to support the measure as “there could very well be a missile heading in our direction as we speak.”


lxxi. This is the famed strategy of “triangulation” developed by political consultant Dick Morris in 1995 as a way for Clinton to defeat the Republicans and win reelection. For Morris’s account of triangulation, see his memoir *Behind the Oval Office* and his strategy guide *The New Prince*. For a less upbeat account of triangulation, see George Stephanopoulos’s memoirs *Only Human: A Political Education*.
