Abstract

Legislative committees perform an important role in negotiating policy between the government and its legislative coalition in parliamentary systems. They serve both to ensure the passage of the government program and as an institutional mechanism for coalition partners to “keep tabs” on one another. The allocation of committee chairs reflects these roles. However, the degree to which parliaments exercise control over policy is reduced by strong presidents. Hence, we should expect that in political systems with strong presidents, these allocation patterns are qualitatively different. We test for the effect of strong presidents on committee systems in East Central and East European democracies. We find that strong executives in post-communist states mitigate the incentives for governing coalitions to monopolize parliamentary committee chairs as well as for coalition partners to “keep tabs” on one another by allocating the government ministerial position and corresponding parliamentary committee chair to members from different parties of the governing coalition.
ALLOCATION OF COMMITTEE CHAIRS AND MINISTERIAL PORTFOLIOS IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE: REGIME TYPE MATTERS

Despite their presence in every democratically elected assembly, the comparative literature on the roles that committee systems perform has been relatively sparse (for the comparative literature addressing committees, see Blondel & Müller-Rommel, 2001; Döring, 1995; Döring & Hallerberg, 2004; Olson & Crowther, 2002). Scholars have devoted the most attention to committees in the United States Congress, where not surprisingly, much of the literature has focused on their role in policy outcomes (Adler & Lapinski, 1997; Austen-Smith, 1990; Cox & McCubbins, 1993; Gilligan & Krehbiel, 1990; 1991; Holcombe & Parker, 1991; Kiewit & McCubbins, 1991; Krehbiel, 1991; Shepsle & Weingast, 1987; 2006; Weingast & Marshall, 1988). In contrast, in European parliaments where governments often dominate the policy agenda and parliaments are consequently more concerned with cabinet formation and the maintenance of governing coalitions (for the literature on this, see Axelrod, 1970; De Swaan, 1973; Dodd, 1976; Downs, 1957; Laver & Schofield, 1990; Laver & Shepsle, 1986; Luebbert, 1986; Riker, 1962; Robertson, 1986), scant attention has been given to the role of committees in negotiating executive-legislative relations.

Recent scholarship, however, has begun to address the issue. Both Thies (2001) and Kim and Loewenberg (2005) have found that the allocation of committee chairs in the German Bundestag permits members of the governing coalition to “keep tabs” on each other.1 Chairs are from parties in the governing coalition other than the one holding the ministry over which the committee exercises oversight. However, Thies found no evidence of a similar pattern in two other western parliaments in which junior ministerial
appointments appeared to perform this role. His findings support the contention of Mattson & Strøm (1995, p. 250) that committees may not play the same role in all European parliaments.

We contribute a cross-national analysis of the role performed by committee systems in negotiating executive-legislative relations in the post-communist democracies of Eastern and East Central Europe. Legislatures in the region emerged at the same time within roughly the same context in the wake of the collapse of communism. While the newly emerging democracies eschewed presidentialism, their parliaments were faced with heads of state whose roles and powers demonstrate greater variation than those in Western Europe. Collectively they present an opportunity to consider the effects of strong presidents on other institutions.

We argue that the distribution of committee chairs in post-communist states is qualitatively different in systems with strong presidents. Committees are important to the legislature’s ability to organize support for the government’s program. These programs represent the results of a bargain reached between members of the governing coalition. Hence, committees potentially serve as an important institution for managing relations between the government and its parliamentary majority. Presidents with legislative powers introduce a complicating factor into the management of those relations.

Presidents and Committee Systems

Many of the newly post-communist states of Europe have adopted semi-presidentialism. Duverger (1980) classified semi-presidential regimes as those combining strong presidents with a government accountable to the legislature. Recent
scholarship has focused on the co-existence of a popularly elected president and legislature as the defining characteristic of semi-presidential systems (Elgie, 1999; Strøm, 2003). This latter approach recognizes that while heads of state are often vested with legislative powers in both semi-presidential and parliamentary systems, popularly elected presidents in semi-presidential systems break the single chain of delegation and accountability from voters to the government that exists in parliamentarism (Strøm, Müller, & Bergman, 2003).

While the emergence of semi-presidential regimes in Eastern and East Central Europe has spurred an interest among scholars in the institutional effects of strong presidents (see for example Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006; Clark & Wittrock, 2005; Strøm & Swindle, 2002; Ishiyama & Kennedy, 2001; Ishiyama & Velten, 1998; Frye, 1997; Hellman, 1996), theory has yet to address the affect of the dual chain of accountability on legislative institutions, in particular committees. Assuming that political parties comprise rational (self-interested) politicians motivated by policy-seekig concerns, versus purely office-seeking, committees can be used to serve their interests in at least two ways. First, they can organize the vote to ensure outcomes preferred by a majority coalition. Given the agenda control that chairs exercise over committees, the allocation pattern of committee chairs should reflect the interests of the majority. Second, they can monitor coalition partners to ensure they do not renege on the policy deals that have been struck. This could be accomplished by allocating the committee chair to a partner in the governing coalition different from the party assigned the corresponding ministerial portfolio.
To assure control of the legislative policy agenda, we would expect governing coalitions to assign committee chairs in a majoritarian fashion; however, it is not clear what affect strong presidents would have on this pattern. In fact, the literature on the effect of strong presidents on policy and that addressing the effect of strong presidents on political parties suggest two very different allocation patterns for legislative chairs: majoritarian and proportional.

The literature addressing the effect of presidentialism on policy began with Tsebelis’ (1995; 2002) argument that both the number of institutions whose consent must be acquired in order for policy to be enacted (i.e., veto players) as well as the policy distance between them effects policy stability. Cox and McCubbins (2001) subsequently contended that institutional conflict was the likely consequence of policy stability when institutions exercising a veto over policy are occupied by partisans from different political perspectives or parties. In effect, the inability of policy-seeking parties to change the status quo facilitates potential conflict. Such conflict might take any number of forms, one of which is legislatures organizing to block presidential initiatives. Prolonged executive-legislative conflict can also result in deal making in order to break the impasse. Both of these responses involve legislative committees. The latter, in particular, is often associated with the rise of powerful chairs invested with gate-keeping (veto) power (Cox & McCubbins, 2001). The logic of the argument behind the policy stability agenda leads to the conclusion that policy-seeking parties faced with strong presidents will be wont to assure majority control over legislative committee assignments, particularly as regards chairs. Therefore, committee assignments,
particularly those of the chairs, are more likely to be majoritarian in systems with strong presidents.

In contrast, the literature of the effect of strong presidents on political parties has long argued that constitutionally strong presidents create disincentives for policy-seeking parties to organize for the explicit purpose of gaining control of the legislative agenda (Epstein, 1967; Strøm 1990; 2000). Shugart (1998) has argued in this vein that regime type effects party strength (whether a candidate campaigns on the basis of party policy reputation or her own personal reputation), while Samuels (2002) contends that presidentialism encourages candidates to focus more on their own electoral success than that of their party, thereby contributing to a decrease in party organization as well as the degree of importance that they attach to legislative elections. In effect, strong presidents undermine the rationale for strong parties by reducing the legislative majority’s monopoly over policy. Parliamentary majorities faced with strong presidents are more likely to engage in consensual politics, which will be reflected in a more proportional allocation of chairs. That is particularly likely if the president is from an opposition party, or as required in a number of systems she is non-partisan (e.g., Lithuania). Hence, the conclusions of these two logics of the effect of the dual chain of accountability on committee chair allocation are directly opposed.

Two important considerations strongly suggest that the latter approach, which argues that policy-seeking parties are more likely to distribute committee chairs proportionally in strong presidential systems, is theoretically more robust. First, a recently emerging literature contends that the dual chain of accountability combined with the legislative powers of the president induces bargaining between the government
headed by a prime minister and the popularly elected president (Samuels & Shugart, 2006). Amorim Neto and Strøm (2006) argue that governments in dual chains of accountability as a result are likely to include a greater number of non-partisan (independent, non-party affiliated) ministers, particularly when the two chief executives are from different parties, in order to achieve compromise on policy between the two. Similarly, we contend that the need for bargaining and compromise will effect the distribution of parliamentary committee chairs.

Second, the argument for proportional allocation is a better fit with the assumptions about parliamentary governance in Western Europe, where scholars most frequently adopt a “legislative monopoly” model that the governing coalition organizes and controls the committees in order to pass its legislative program in the most efficient manner possible (Döring, 1995). While committees also serve as important fora within which to deliberate, the evidence in West European parliamentary systems is that the parliamentary coalition does not permit the key elements of the government’s program to be seriously challenged (Damgaard & Mattson, 2004; Mattson & Strøm, 2004). Given the importance of chairs in setting the agenda of their committees, chairs from opposition parties or non-coalition members could threaten the efficiency of the coalition’s legislative program. Therefore, we would expect the allocation of parliamentary committee chairs to demonstrate a clear majoritarian pattern. However, when faced with strong presidents capable of breaking the governing coalition’s monopoly on policy control, governing coalitions are forced to enter into bargaining with the head of state. Committee chairs can assist in achieving the necessary consensus if they are more proportionately allocated.
We begin by testing the relationship between presidential strength and the allocation pattern of parliamentary committee chairs. We hypothesize that a proportional allocation pattern is associated with stronger presidents, confirming the theory that the dual chain of accountability introduced by these heads of states imposes consensus and bargaining on parliamentary governance that would otherwise comprise a governing coalition exercising a monopoly on policy and legislative production.

We then turn our attention to the effect that strong presidents have on the role of committees in assisting coalition partners to “keep tabs” on one another. If parties are policy-seeking, then they have an interest in controlling policy outcomes. Hence, they seek to be allotted those ministries of greatest interest to them. However, being allotted a particular government portfolio does not in and of itself assure legislative concurrence on policy proposals within the jurisdictional purview of the ministry. The proposals of a ministry must ultimately achieve legislative concurrence. Legislative committees constitute an important point at which the government and parliament as institutions interact for the first time on policy proposals. Of particular importance is the committee chair, who is charged with facilitating the agenda as well as framing the legislative debate on the issue. Hence, in order to assure control over a policy dimension, political parties also seek to be allotted the chair of the legislative committee with oversight responsibilities on the same dimension.

However, their ability to do so is limited by the interests of the other parties to the coalition. Governments in parliamentary systems are formed on the basis of a program cobbled together by the members of the governing coalition (De Winter, 2004; Strøm and Müller 1999; 2004; Warwick, 1999). To be enforceable these coalition agreements must
be subject to monitoring. One means for doing so is provided by the committee systems. Therefore, efforts to allocate to the same party both a ministry and the chair of the corresponding committee are likely to be met with opposition; and the likelihood that a party in a ruling legislative coalition will be awarded both a ministerial portfolio and the chair of the legislative committee exercising oversight is not particularly high.

Nonetheless, the final allocation decision on government and legislative positions will be informed by the relative negotiating position of each party. The party receiving the post of Prime Minister will be especially keen to press for obtaining control of key ministries with as little legislative oversight as possible. While studies of the German lower house (Thies, 2001; Kim & Loewenberg, 2005) have found that government portfolios and committee chairs are allotted to different parties in the ruling coalition, such is not always the case in western political systems (Thies 2001).

If, as we argue, strong presidents who are players in the policy process induce bargaining between themselves and governments and legislative majorities to achieve policy outcomes, then we should expect that the likelihood of one party being allotted both a ministerial portfolio and the corresponding legislative committee chair will be further reduced. Bargaining between the president and government requires the maintenance of a legislative consensus sufficient to strengthen the government in the process. Consensus is facilitated by a system of checks and balances. Hence, parties are not likely to be able to wrest control of both a ministry and the corresponding committee chair.

Thus, we test two sets of hypotheses. First, we expect that the allocation pattern for committee chairs is majoritarian in political systems with weak presidents and
porportional in those with strong presidents. Second, we test for evidence of an additional pattern between that of the allocation of chairs and corresponding ministerial portfolios. We hypothesize committee chairs are more likely to be distributed to parties other than the one holding the ministerial portfolio within the committee’s jurisdiction in systems with strong presidents.

**Presidents and the Assignment of Committee Chairs**

The operation of both semi-presidentialism and parliamentarism in democracies is qualitatively different from that in both hybrid (partially authoritarian, not fully democratic) and authoritarian political systems. Therefore, we include only those post-communist states of Eastern and East Central Europe in the analysis with a score of two or lower on the Freedom House political rights index and three or lower on the civil liberties index. The countries and their Freedom House scores are at Table 1. We do not include data on portfolio and chair allocation from the post-transition foundational election in order to avoid the possibility that the data would be skewed by the choices of politicians not yet sufficiently familiar with the new constitutional system. All subsequent elections for which data are available are included in the analysis.

[Place Table 1 about here.]

We collected data on our dependent variable, the percentage of committee chairs allocated to the governing coalition, using a variety of on-line sources on the party affiliation of ministers and committee chairs for each government in each of the countries included in the analysis.² For all of the states except Bulgaria a full list of current ministers is available on the states’ official government website. In the case of Bulgaria,
the minister is listed on the individual ministry websites. The party affiliation for most
ministers is available in their biographies posted on either the government’s or the
ministry’s website.

Legislative committee chairs are identified on the respective parliamentary
websites listing committee membership. Their party affiliations are listed on the web
page detailing committee membership for Latvia, Romania, and Slovakia. Those for
Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, and Slovenia are listed in the biographies of the chairs that
are linked to the parliamentary website. In the case of Croatia, we had to cross-check
committee chairs against a list of deputies by party affiliation.

Table 2 lists the percentage of committee chairs delegated to parties of the
governing coalition for each case in our data base. There is a decided variation from a
low of 32.1% for Poland in 2005 to a high of 100% for Lithuania in 2004. The data
demonstrate an almost normal distribution about a mean of 68.6% with a median of
68.0% and a mode of 60%. Hence, the general pattern favors a majoritarian pattern.

[Place Table 2 about here.]

Our independent variable of concern is presidential strength. There is a growing
scholarly consensus on the use of a method proposed by Shugart and Carey (1992) and
scale in their analysis of the distribution of non-partisan ministers in European
democracies. An important drawback to the modified Shugart and Carey index is that it
does not take into account whether a head of state is directly elected. However, Metcalf
(2000) has demonstrated the ability of the modified index to delineate the difference
between semi-presidentialism and other regime types in several countries of East Central
and Western Europe. Furthermore, while Frye (1997) and Hellman (1996) have developed a presidential power index that weights the final score based on whether the head of state is elected, their use of a dichotomous scoring system for each presidential power\(^3\) gives us a less nuanced picture of the president’s legislative strength than that provided by the Shugart and Carey index. Moreover, their twenty-seven categories are weighted in favor of appointments of state officials (of which there are ten). Indeed, many of the categories are more meaningfully combined.

We use Shugart and Carey’s index as revised by Metcalf to measure presidential strength as a function of constitutional powers over policy and the government. Their index is an additive scale of ordinal scores on the legislative and non-legislative powers of the president. Presidents are scored from 0 to 4 based on criteria in each of nine specific powers, with the final score being the sum of the category scores. The stronger the president is, the higher the resulting score will be. The legislative powers address prerogatives that permit the president to directly influence policy. They include the veto, the package veto, decree authority, the exclusive right to introduce legislation, budgetary authority, and the right to refer a matter for referendum. Metcalf (2000) added the right to refer a matter for judicial review to the list. The non-legislative powers address the president’s authority over the government and its legislative majority. They include government censure, and dissolution of the assembly, to which Metcalf adds cabinet appointment and cabinet dismissal.

The Shugart and Carey (1992) presidential strength scores as modified by Metcalf (2000) for the countries in our analysis are at Table 3. The scores range from 3 (Slovenia) to 10 (Romania). (The highest score possible on the scale is 44.) These
relatively low scores are not surprising, since the powers included in the index are those
exercised by chief executives in Latin America, where presidents are quite strong.
Several of these powers are not commonly identified in European constitutions. Among
them are the package veto, the exclusive right to introduce legislation, and budgetary
authority.

We include two control variables in the analysis: a dummy variable indicating
whether the president’s party is in the governing coalition and a dummy variable for
bicameralism. The inclusion of the president’s party in the government reduces the need
for bargaining between the two to that which would normally occur within the governing
coalition itself. In such cases, presidents are less likely to induce proportionality in the
allocation of legislative committee chairs. On the other hand, bicameralism requires
bargaining between the governing coalition in the lower house in much the same way as a
strong president does. Hence, we should expect upper houses to exert pressure toward
proportionality in the allocation of committee chairs.

Our data set comprises pooled cross-section, time series data and constitutes
unbalanced panel data. To test the first hypothesis, we use a random effects model to
estimate the effect of presidential strength on the percent of committee chairs allotted to
members of the governing legislative coalition. The model assumes that disturbances in
calculating the standard errors and variance-covariance estimates are by default
heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated across panels. The model also
corrects for errors in the estimators induced by a small number of observations.
The results of the regression model, reported in the left hand column of Table 4, support our hypothesis. As presidential strength increases, the number of chairs in the hands of the governing coalition decreases. The relationship is statistically significant at the .020 level. Furthermore, both bicameralism and the president’s party being in the governing coalition exert an effect in the expected direction on the allocation pattern of committee chairs. Bicameralism increases the tendency toward proportionality and when a president’s party is in the governing coalition the tendency toward majoritarianism is enhanced. However, the latter effect is not statistically significant ($\rho = .398$). (The effect of bicameralism is significant at the .022 level.)

[Place Table 4 about here.]

There are reasons to believe that the effect of presidents on the distribution of committee chairs will manifest itself more clearly over time. Since the effect is a psychological one, it must be learned. We might expect that this learning would occur in the 1990s over the course of the first several election cycles. By the 2000s, political players would have settled into patterns of behavior induced by a strong president.

To test for this possibility, we report the results of our model taking out elections in the 1990s.\(^1\) The results reported in the right hand column of Table 4 confirm our conjecture. The statistical significance of the relationship between strong presidents and proportional distribution of parliamentary chairs is increased. Furthermore, while the overall variance explained has only increased marginally, the effect of bicameralism remains the same; and the president’s party being in government is now statistically

\(^1\) There are eight such elections in our data base.
relevant (at the .000 level). As we would expect, a president whose party is in
government induces a greater likelihood of majoritarian distribution.

Our analysis to this point offers support for our theoretical suppositions. While
formal rules and informal conventions appear to weigh in favor of majority allocation of
committee chairs, the pattern appears to be more proportional in systems with stronger
presidents.

Executive-Legislative Relations: The Role of Committee Systems

We now address the relationship between the role that committee chairs play in
colaboration partners’ “keeping tabs” on one another and presidential strength. Our
hypothesis is that a ministerial portfolio and the chair of the corresponding legislative
committee exercising oversight are more likely to be allocated to the same party in a
governing coalition in weak presidential systems than in systems with strong chief
executives.

We regress the proportion of instances in which the same party from the
governing coalition holds both the ministry and the chair of the committee charged with
legislative oversight on our measure of presidential power. As before, we test a random
effects model that controls for bicameralism and whether the president’s party is in
government. and estimates the effect of presidential strength. The results at Table 5 are
disappointing. The relationship between presidential strength and oversight in the hands
of the same government party is not only in the opposite direction than that hypothesized,
it is significant at the .173 level. Furthermore, the overall variance explained is quite
low. The results are only somewhat better when we take out early elections. The
The relationship between presidential strength and oversight patterns is now in the direction hypothesized, but the statistical significance is at the .717 level. Furthermore, while bicameralism exerts a statistically significant effect, the overall variance explained remains low.

[Place Table 5 about here.]

It is likely that governments and presidents are more concerned about controlling certain key ministries. If so, then these ministries would be more likely to demonstrate the oversight relationship that we expect. Furthermore, some legislatures are subject to informal norms and others to legal restrictions requiring the allocation of committee chairs to opposition parties. To meet these expectations, governing coalitions are more likely to allocate less important chairs in order to retain those considered more critical.

Laver and Schofield (1990, p. 182) infer from an analysis of portfolio allocation in thirteen West European democracies from 1945 to 1970 (Browne & Feste, 1975) that political parties most prefer the ministries of defense, finance, economics, and foreign affairs. We redo the analysis focusing on these four chairs and their corresponding ministries and regress the proportion of key chairs in the hands of the same party as that of the ministry over which the committee exercises jurisdiction on presidential strength scores. The results are reported in Table 6.

For all elections, there is an increase in the overall variance explained. Moreover, presidential strength exerts an effect in the direction hypothesized, but neither it nor any of the other variables are statistically significant. However, the results are markedly different once we exclude earlier elections from consideration. Presidential strength exerts a statistically significant effect ($\rho = .044$) on the proportion of key committee chairs
and the corresponding minister that are allocated to the same party. As we hypothesized, as presidential strength increases, the likelihood of ministerial oversight increases over key ministries. The overall variance explained is above thirty percent.

Conclusions and Implications

Our results support the hypothesis that proportional allocation of committees is associated with heads of state endowed with significant constitutional powers. Hence, we are relatively confident in concluding that strong presidents in post-communist Europe reduce the incentives for political powers in the lower house to seek majoritarian control of the committee system. We also find some support that strong presidents are associated with a higher likelihood of legislative oversight of ministerial positions by coalition partners. Taken together, our findings support our theoretical contention that strong heads of state impose consensus and bargaining on a parliamentary majority and its government. Strong presidents in semi-presidential systems break down the standard model of parliamentary systems in which the government working with a parliamentary majority exercises a monopoly over law production. In short, semi-presidentialism produces consensual governance. Both the legislative committee system as well as relations between the legislature and the government are organized to achieve this.

Other institutions may exert similar effects, among them an upper chamber. The literature suggests that even those playing a relatively weak role in the legislative process nonetheless effect outcomes (e.g., Druckman & Thies, 2002). Our findings partially support this argument. We find a statistically significant relationship between the presence of an upper chamber and the tendency toward proportional distribution of
legislative committee chairs (at the .017 level). However, contrary to the theoretical argument, the results of the regression models reported in Table 6 indicate that upper chambers are associated with a higher likelihood of legislative oversight of ministerial positions by coalition partners, not less.

The intriguing question that all of this raises is which exerts the greater effect over legislative organizational behavior: whether an institution possesses a separate mandate from that of the lower house or whether an institution is invested with constitutional powers over policy. Tsebelis’ (1995; 2002) model of policy stability focuses on the latter. In essence, he is more concerned with power sharing. Institutions whose consent is required to change a policy, exert an effect on the final outcome. Our results lend support to this contention: institutions are likely to change the organizational behavior of the lower house and government as constitutions reduce the control of the former over policy outcomes. Other institutional designs might have the same effect, to include consociationalism (constitutional guarantees removing jurisdiction over key policy areas from a central government or legislature); federalism (empowering regions with significant responsibility for policy); special powers allotted to the government (over the legislature), which reduce the potential for committees to effect policy outcomes; special councils empowered with legislative powers or veto powers; and presidential power not accounted for by our classification schema.

Finally, our argument and findings offer qualified support for those who argue that ministerial abdication is not uncommon in coalitional government, at least in post-communist Europe. The logic behind the hypotheses we tested is that parties to a coalition wish to be free from the constraints that might be placed upon them by
legislative institutions. It is plausible that they are more willing to accept institutional constraints from within the government itself (such as that exercised by ministerial coordinating councils, budgets issuing from the ministry of finance, or junior ministerial appointments from other parties to the coalition). While beyond the scope of this paper, nevertheless, it strikes us as counter-intuitive that strong presidents reduce the incentives to seek ministerial autonomy vis-à-vis the legislature but not within the government. This raises the possibility that parties to coalitional government in the newer democracies of East and East Central Europe exercise greater autonomy than elsewhere in Europe, which may well account for the relatively short life-span of governments in many states of the region.
### Table 1 Countries Included in the Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Freedom House Scores</th>
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<td>Election</td>
<td>Proportion of Chairs from the Governing Coalition (percentage)</td>
<td>Proportion of Key* Chairs from the Governing Coalition (percentage)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>11/17</td>
<td>3/4</td>
</tr>
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<td>16/17</td>
<td>4/4</td>
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<td>11/17</td>
<td>3/4</td>
</tr>
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<td>5/12</td>
<td>2/4</td>
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<td>3/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>10/13</td>
<td>2/4</td>
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</table>

*The “Key Committees” are defined as defense, finance, economics, and foreign affairs.*

22
### Table 3: Presidential Strength*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Cabinet appointment</th>
<th>Cabinet dismissal</th>
<th>Censure</th>
<th>Dissolution of Assembly</th>
<th>Package Veto</th>
<th>Partial Veto</th>
<th>Decree</th>
<th>Legislation Proposal</th>
<th>Budgetary Powers</th>
<th>Referendum</th>
<th>Judicial review</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>1</td>
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</table>

Table 4  
Random Effects Model 1: Proportion of Committee Chairs Held by the Governing Coalition on Presidential Strength$^{1}$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Elections</th>
<th>Elections In the 2000s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>$.977*</td>
<td>$.998*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.085)</td>
<td>(.035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Strength</td>
<td>-.033**$^{2}$</td>
<td>-.041*$^{3}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.014)</td>
<td>(.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President’s Party in the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governing Coalition</td>
<td>.042</td>
<td>.061*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.050)</td>
<td>(.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicameralism</td>
<td>-.176**</td>
<td>-.077**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.077)</td>
<td>(.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r^2$</td>
<td>= .327</td>
<td>= .355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho$</td>
<td>= .000</td>
<td>= .000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^{1}$ Estimators are reported with the standard error in parentheses.  
$^{2}$ significant at the .020 level  
$^{3}$ significant at the .000 level  
* significant at the .001 level or less  
** significant at the .050 level or less
Table 5
Random Effects Model 2: Proportion of Committee Chairs and the Corresponding Ministry Held by the Same Party in the Governing Coalition on Presidential Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Elections</th>
<th>Elections In the 2000s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.178* (.048)</td>
<td>.226 (.135)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Presidential Strength</td>
<td>.007 (0.005)</td>
<td>-.0073 (.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President’s Party in the</td>
<td>.019 (.055)</td>
<td>.078 (.072)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governing Coalition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicameralism</td>
<td>.036 (.045)</td>
<td>.067* (.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r^2$</td>
<td>= .020</td>
<td>.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho$</td>
<td>= .000</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Estimators are reported with the standard error in parentheses.
2 significant at the .173 level
3 significant at the .717 level
* significant at the .001 level or less
** significant at the .050 level or less
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Elections</th>
<th>Elections In the 2000s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.255**</td>
<td>.400**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.088)</td>
<td>(.131)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Strength</td>
<td>-.000&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.038&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.019)</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President’s Party in the</td>
<td>.139</td>
<td>.318**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governing Coalition</td>
<td>(.185)</td>
<td>(.100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicameralism</td>
<td>.174</td>
<td>.288*</td>
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<td>(.113)</td>
<td>.028</td>
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<td>ri =</td>
<td>.092</td>
<td>.310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ρ =</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<sup>1</sup> Estimators are reported with the standard error in parentheses.
<sup>2</sup> significant at the 1.000 level
<sup>3</sup> significant at the .000 level
* significant at the .001 level or less
** significant at the .050 level or less
REFERENCES


Hellman, Joel. “Constitutions and Economic Reform in Postcommunist Transitions.”


Endnotes

1 Martin and Vanberg (2004) find that parliamentary scrutiny is another important factor in maintaining coalition bargains in the German and Dutch political systems.

2 Available from the authors by email request.

3 A president is scored a 1 in a given category when he does not share the power with the government or the legislature, a .5 when he does, and 0 when he is not constitutionally invested with the power.