

## **Women's Attitudes to Market Reform in Russia: The Importance of Income**

Ernest P. Goss, Ph.D.  
Professor of Economics & MacAllister Chairholder  
Department of Economics & Finance  
Creighton University  
Omaha, Nebraska 68178  
(402) 280-4757  
[ernieg@creighton.edu](mailto:ernieg@creighton.edu)

Terry D. Clark, Ph.D.  
Professor of Political Science &  
Director of the Graduate Program in International Relations  
Department of Political Science  
Creighton University  
Omaha, Nebraska 68178  
(402) 280-4712  
[tclark@creighton.edu](mailto:tclark@creighton.edu)

Larisa Kosova  
Independent Institute for Social Policy  
19a Khlebny per.  
121019 Moscow, Russia  
(7-095) 202-4070  
[lkos@socialpolicy.ru](mailto:lkos@socialpolicy.ru)

## **Women's Attitudes to Market Reform in Russia: The Importance of Income**

### **Abstract**

Russian economic reform, focused on expanding privatization and fundamental institutional restructuring, has produced large-scale economic dislocations for much of the population. This has particularly been the case for women. Over the course of more than nine years of market reform, the ratio of female to male wages fell from approximately seventy percent to less than fifty percent. Using VCIOM survey data from 1994 and 2000, we examine how the relative wage deterioration for women affected their attitudes to market reform. We find no evidence for the gender gap theory. Our results indicate that women's support for reform, as men's, was strongly influenced by personal or family economic circumstances. To the degree that there is a gender gap in support for market reform, it is related to the differential in male and female earnings and not other gender specific issues.

## **Women's Attitudes to Market Reform in Russia: Evidence of the Gender Gap?**

### *The Gender Gap*

Since the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan, many scholars have noted the emergence of a gender gap in American politics. Women are increasingly distinguishable from men in political attitudes. In particular, research has concluded that they are more concerned with issues of social welfare and justice (Cook, 1979; Baxter and Lansing, 1980; Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986; Scott, Matland, Michelbach, and Bornstein, 2001). It is often asserted that these differences account for differing electoral behavior between men and women. Supporting this hypothesis, Welch and Hibbing (1992) found that women were less likely than men to vote on the basis of their personal financial situation, but more likely to do so on the basis of their evaluation of the overall state of the national economy. While scholars have examined similar electoral patterns among women in other western liberal democracies (Eulau and Lewis-Beck, 1985; Lewis-Beck, 1986), comparatively few have considered the first-order link between gender and political attitudes that is thought to lie behind the behavioral differences.

We examine the relationship between gender and political attitudes in Russia. If women are more inclined to support social justice and compassion issues, then we should find evidence of the same in their attitudes toward market reforms in Russia. We hypothesize that controlling for their lower economic status, women demonstrated less support for market reform than men during the period 1994 to 2000. The question of the relationship between gender and support for market reform in Russia is far from insignificant. If as previous research indicates, women have borne a disproportionate share of the hardships associated with the reform effort, then we should expect that Russian women would provide a significant reservoir of support for statist or even

socialist solutions. However, if there is a Russian “gender gap” that is not accounted for by economic well-being, then reversing the decline in the standard of living experienced by Russian women may not increase support for the market reforms. Furthermore, insofar as support for economic reform is linked to support for political democracy, the issue is even more critical.

In order to investigate these issues, we control for other important factors affecting support for reform that are likely to differ between men and women. For example, despite higher education levels among women, they have been less supportive of reform (Finifter, 1996). This apparent anomaly may well be explained by the fact that better educated Russian women were over-represented in those sectors of the economy most negatively affected by reduced government budgets, especially in the areas of healthcare and education. By taking advantage of a more robust micro-dataset that includes labor market, family and personal attributes, the present study more adequately estimates the relationship among gender, economic conditions and support for market reform in the Russian Federation.

To untangle the impact of various factors influencing support for market reform, we apply regression analysis to Russian data drawn from two time periods, March 1994 and March 2000. Data from 1994 provide insight into conditions soon after implementation of market reforms, while data from March 2000 profile attitudes toward reform just prior to the election of President Vladimir Putin. It is our contention that to gauge the association among gender and attitudes toward market reform, the analysis must span a sufficiently long period of the post-Soviet era in order to capture any change in attitudes toward market reform.

### ***Economic Voting***

Economic reform in Russia has been marked by wage and price liberalization, privatization of state-owned enterprises, trade liberalization, and tax and legal reforms. Coincident with

the market reform has been a significant and protracted economic downturn in Russia. Data in Table 1 validate the decline in overall Russian economic performance since 1990. Except for an upturn in Russia's real GDP at the end of the decade, the data show a consistent decline in Russia's economic performance since 1990. Despite a necessary correction in the reform process after the collapse of the ruble in 1998, more than nine years of radical market reform have produced a marked decline in economic well-being for a substantial portion of the Russian population (Gaddy and Ickes, 1999).

Women have borne a disproportionate share of the burdens generated by the market reform process. The Soviet Union created relatively good market circumstances for women, with male to female wage differentials similar to those in Western countries, but much smaller than those in less-developed countries. The dissolution of the Soviet Union changed all of this. The deconstruction of the social-welfare state, in particular, generated significant differences in women's relative economic position across countries of the former Soviet Union.

Izyumov and Razumnova (2000) concluded that with the initiation of market reform, Russian government officials no longer enforced the principle of "equal pay for equal work" thus producing a decline in the ratio of women's to men's average wages from seventy percent in 1992 to forty percent in 1998. They also found that many firms preferred to hire men since social benefits, such as health care and maternity leave, were no longer paid by the state, but by individual employers. As a result, seven years of continued economic depression, followed by the financial crisis of August 1998, produced sharp increases in unemployment among women. Izyumov and Razumnova estimated that while women comprised close to fifty percent of the total labor force in the period 1992 to 1998, they accounted for roughly two-thirds of the officially registered unemployed. Martin (1998) argued similarly that women were more likely to be

among the "hidden unemployed" because employers often choose to place them on extended maternity leave and hire men who are less likely to take maternity, family or sick leave. Finally, Brainerd (2000) found that the introduction of the market reform process was not gender-neutral, with reform measures affecting women more negatively.

While past research has highlighted the relative decline of women's economic status, it has paid less attention to the question of how this decline influenced women's attitudes toward market reforms. Scholars examining the relationship between economic status and attitudes toward reform in the context of the former communist states of East and East Central Europe have subjected the relationship between gender and support for reform to cursory analysis at best, focusing instead on non-gender explanations, such as age, education, personal values, and satisfaction with the reforms (Finifter and Mickiewicz, 1992; Duch, 1993, 1995; Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger, 1994; Mason, 1995).

The literature on economic voting strongly suggests that the greater hardships borne by women should result in their expressing less support for the continuation of the market reforms. At the core of the research on economic voting is the notion that citizens vote in accordance with their assessment of their financial position. In good times they vote for the incumbent, in bad times they vote against the incumbent (Key, 1966; Fiorina, 1981; Kiewiet and Rivers, 1984). Pursuing this idea, numerous studies have found a strong correlation between aggregate economic conditions and electoral outcomes in U.S. presidential elections (Tufte, 1978; Hibbs, 1987; Erikson, 1989).<sup>1</sup> Subsequent research has uncovered correlations between individual

---

<sup>1</sup> Efforts to extend the argument to congressional elections have not been as fruitful. Correlations have been found between aggregate economic factors and the fate of the president's party in Congress (Kramer, 1971; Lepper, 1974; Tufte, 1975; Hibbs, 1982; Lewis-Beck and Rice, 1984; Born, 1986);<sup>1</sup> however, no consistent relationship has yet been uncovered between the subjective economic evaluations of individuals and electoral behavior. Fiorina (1978) found no evidence for *pocketbook* voting in congressional elections while Kuklinski and West (1981) found evidence of economic voting in Senate elections, but not House voting. Hibbing and Alford's (1981)

evaluations of both personal financial situation (*pocketbook* evaluations) and the overall economy (*sociotropic* evaluations) on one's electoral behavior (Markus, 1988). Thus, those who view either their own personal situation, or that of the overall economy, to be poor are more likely to vote against an incumbent president. Hence, we should expect that as the economic position of Russia deteriorates, they will be more likely to be opposed to the reforms (and be more likely to vote against their implementation).

The "gender gap" theory however takes the argument one step further and contends that women have different values than men. In particular, scholars have concluded that they are more likely to be concerned with social justice and welfare issues than men (Cook, 1979; Baxter and Lansing, 1980; Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986; Scott, Matland, Michelbach, and Bornstein, 2001). Hence, even as their economic fortunes improve, they will remain less likely than men to support market reforms. Such a contention appears to be partially supported by the findings of Carnaghan and Bahry (1990). Their comprehensive analysis of the relationship between gender and a number of political and economic attitudes employing Soviet-era data found that women were slightly more likely than men to support social programs, however, they were less likely than men to support state control of the economy. They conjectured that differences estimated in their study might disappear if they were able to include more of the factors that differentiated women. This paper considers the relationship between gender, the personal impact of the reforms, and support for continuation of the market reforms. By taking advantage of a more robust dataset, the present study adds Carnaghan and Bahry's missing factors in a statistical analysis analyzing the population of the Russian Federation in the post-Soviet era.

---

finding that only congressional incumbents in the president's party were subjected to voter wrath in poor economic times was subsequently challenged by Fiorina (1983).

One would expect *a priori* that both women's evaluation of their personal economic situation, termed *pocketbook*, and of the overall economy, labeled *sociotropic*, should generate lower support for economic reform among women given the greater economic burden they have shouldered. Additionally irrespective of economic evaluations, we are interested in the existence of a Russian "gender gap" whose explanation lies beyond subjective economic evaluation. We test the hypothesis that such a "gap" accounts for women disproportionately opposing market reforms in Russia, especially given the decline in social welfare provided by the state after market reform. The Russian government's ability to deal with these issues has been substantially weakened by the "hollowing out" of the state that has attended the reforms. The next section discusses the data used in the empirical tests.

### ***Data and Estimation Technique***

We use data collected in the Russian Federation by the Russian Center for Public Opinion and Marketing Research (VCIOM) in March, 1994 and March 2000 to investigate the relationship among attitudes toward reform, economic conditions and gender. Every two months since the breakup of the Soviet Union, VCIOM has surveyed a randomly selected sample of approximately 2,500 Russian citizens using a multi-stage stratified sampling technique. VCIOM divides the territorial-administrative divisions of the Russian Federation into 11 major economic-geographical regions. While this categorization results in regions that are representative of the general Russian population on a number of dimensions - to include political, economic, and social - it does not represent the structure of the population of Russia by settlement type. To resolve this problem, VCIOM collapses the two comparatively small economic-geographical regions (the Northern and Northwestern regions) into a single region.

It should be noted, that circumstances require that VCIOM drop some of the territorial-administrative units of the Russian Federation from the sectioning process. VCIOM excludes Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, and Northern Ossetia due to the instability and deployment of the Russian military in these regions. VCIOM also excludes the "autonomies" in the Far North - Nenetsky AO, Hanty-Mansyiskiy AO, Yamalo-Nenetsky AO, Taymyrskiy AO, Evenkiyskiy AO, Kamchatka, Chukotka, and Sakhalin - as they are unreachable most of the year due to forbidding weather conditions. Altogether VCIOM excludes twelve territorial-administrative regions comprising 5.48 percent of the population of the Russian Federation.

As conjectured by Carnaghan and Bahry (1990) differences in support for market reform between men and women may stem from other important factors that distinguish Russian men from women. In order to untangle these impacts and to gain a more accurate picture of the relationship among gender, support for market reform and economic circumstances, we apply multivariate analysis to the sample data. Our data permit us to consider occupation (private sector manager, government bureaucrat, and blue collar worker) and urban-rural residence.

We estimate the impact of the factors on support for reform at Equation (1) using logit regression.  $SR$  represents the individual's support for reform,  $P$  is a variable representing personal, family and human capital characteristics,  $L$  is a variable indicating geographic location, and  $M$  is a vector of economic and job related factors. *Pocketbook* is a variable indicating the individual's assessment of his/her personal economic circumstance and *Sociotropic* is a variable indicating the individual's assessment of the overall Russian economy. *Salary* is the individual's monthly salary in rubles and  $\varepsilon$  is the error term reflecting unobserved random factors. We include self-reported monthly salary in the analysis as an objective measure of economic well-being. Salary data were

not available for pensioners or for those who were not employed.

$$SR = f(P, L, M, Pocketbook, Sociotropic, Salary, \varepsilon) \quad (1)$$

The definition and mean value by gender of each variable used in the analysis are presented in Table 2. In terms of the variables of interest, descriptive data show that for both 1994 and 2000, women were paid a lower salary, less supportive of market reform, and more likely to have negative *pocketbook* evaluations. On the other hand, men were more likely to have negative *sociotropic* evaluations in 1994, and there was no difference between men and women regarding *sociotropic* evaluations in 2000. The dynamics of Russian attitudes toward reform by gender and economic positions from the sample are summarized in Table 3. As past research concluded, men were more supportive of market reform than women in each survey year. This linkage held after controlling for *pocketbook/sociotropic* assessments and salary. In no year or group, did a higher percentage of women support market reform than men. In fact the ratio of females to males support for market reform ranged between 0.717 and 0.794. The next section presents empirical findings from the estimation of Equation (1).

### ***Findings***

Estimates of Equation (1) for each year are presented in Table 4. Estimates tend to validate *a priori* expectations with no control variable having an unexpected and statistically significant sign. For example, higher levels of education are positively associated with support for market reform, while age is negatively correlated with support for reform. The results provide outcomes very consistent with prior studies that show males, younger individuals and college graduates were more likely to support market reform (Finifter and Mickiewicz, 1992; Duch,

1993, 1995; Miller, Hesli and Reisinger 1994; Mason 1995; Lokshin and Popkin, 1999; Brainerd, 2000; Izyumov and Razumnova, 2000).

The three economic measures of well-being of most direct interest to this paper, *Pocketbook*, *Sociotropic* and *Salary*, present some interesting findings. In each case, the variable is interacted with the binary variable *Male* to create another variable. Thus for example, the coefficient for the variable Pocketbook for women in 1994 is  $-0.5606$ . The coefficient for this variable for men in 1994 is the coefficient for *Pocketbook* plus the coefficient for the interaction variable between *Male* and *Pocketbook*. For men, the net coefficient for *Pocketbook* in 1994 is  $-0.6912$  or  $-0.5606 + (-0.1306)$ . As presented in Table 4, negative pocketbook assessments have the expected negative and statistically significant impact on support for market reform in 1994 and 2000. However, contrary to the gender gap thesis, there is no statistically significant difference between men and women for this variable. Once we control for personal financial assessment, women are no more likely to oppose the reforms than men.

The argument for the existence of gender specific differences toward economic reform apart from subjective evaluation is also not supported by the findings relative to the impact of sociotropic evaluations on support for reform. The impact of *Sociotropic* on support for reform is ambiguous with the variable possessing the expected negative and statistically significant sign for 1994 and no statistical difference between men and women. However in 2000, the variables possess an unexpected positive and statistically significant sign in 2000 (again with no statistical difference between men and women).

The counter-intuitive estimated relationship between *Sociotropic* and support for reform in 2000 may well be explained by the fact that the 2000 survey was administered in the wake of the ascendancy of Putin. Those with a negative assessment of the overall state of the Russian

economy may have pinned their hopes on Putin and supported reform despite their current assessment of the Russian economy. Such a contention is supported by the high public approval ratings enjoyed by Putin both before and after his election as President in spring 2000 (Hanson, 2001; McFaul, 2000), which at least one observer argues is attributable to hopes among Russians that Putin would make substantial changes to the Yeltsin economic policy that would result in marked improvements in their personal fortunes (Shevtsova, 2000).

Importantly, the variable *Salary* had no statistically significant impact in 1994, but had a positive and statistically significant impact on support for reform in 2000. The impact of an individual's salary on support for reform for women was less than for men for 1994, but larger for 2000. However in both cases, the difference between men and women was not statistically significant. Once again, we find no evidence for the existence of a gender-specific gender gap. As salary increases, both women and men, are more supportive of market reform with the impact larger and statistically significant in 2000. While some have argued that the deterioration of women's socioeconomic situation brought on by market reform has had a marked influence on women's quality of life especially for women with young children and disabled children or single parents (Samarina, 2001), our results indicate that this deterioration, at least as captured by our three economic variables, has had little differential impact on women's support for reform. The question remains however why does support for market reform continue to differ between men and women? The simple answer appears to be that men earn more and have a higher assessment of their personal economic circumstances than women.

The conventional wisdom is that reforms have been implemented more fully in Moscow than in rural areas and in small towns. Thus one should measure a larger change in the elasticity of the salary variable for Moscow residents than for rural and small town residents. Table 5

presents the estimation of Equation (1) for residents of Moscow, big cities, small towns, and rural areas for 2000. Our results indicate that most of the geographic variables have the expected impact on support for reform (Lokshin and Ravallion, 2000).<sup>2</sup> Relative to rural residents and those living in towns, residents of Moscow and other large cities are more supportive of market reform. Perhaps, however, there are differences between men and women's attitudes toward reform in the larger cities or in the rural areas. The fact that the impact of regionality and its statistical significance for both women and men are much greater for 2000 in Moscow suggests this might be the case.

As the results indicate, the variable *Salary* has a much larger impact for Moscow residents and big city residents than for either small town residents or rural residents. Furthermore as salary rises, the impact of salary on support for reform is larger for women than men for Moscow residents only. However, for small town and rural residents, salary has no impact, statistically speaking, on support for market reform and for big city residents salary's impact does not differ between men and women. Figure 1 provides a profile of the relationship between support for reform and the ratio of women to men's salary for the three areas. Figure 1 shows that at a salary of approximately 2,000 rubles for urban residents, men and women are equally supportive of market reform. Beyond 2,000 rubles, women are actually more supportive of reform than men. Ignoring statistical significance, the estimated coefficients indicate that the opposite trend is observed for residents of small towns and rural areas. That is, as salary rises, men's support for reform rises more quickly than women's.

---

<sup>2</sup>Lokshin and Popkin (1999) found that families living in Moscow or St. Petersburg were much less likely to be poor and more likely to be classified as rich or never poor.

Clearly in Moscow where market reform implementation is much more advanced than in small towns and rural areas, those who earn a higher salary, particularly women, are much more supportive of market reform. They have experienced a positive impact of reform on their living conditions. In contrast, the reforms have been far less in evidence outside of the larger cities where Soviet-era enterprises and collective farms continue to dominate the local economy. Often these enterprises are producing goods for which there is at best a limited market. Given the general lack of alternative employment opportunities, Russians living in these areas are more likely to have experienced a decided downward shift in their standard of living from the Soviet era. This has given rise to a marked cynicism toward the idea of reform itself.

### ***Implications***

Past research has found that Russian women have been more economically vulnerable and have been more likely to have lost their jobs as a result of market reforms and the subsequent downsizing of the state sector than their male counterparts. Not surprisingly, our findings indicate reductions in the ratio of women to men salaries has likely reduced women's support for market for reform relative to men, *ceteris paribus*. Our findings demonstrate a clear and consistent difference in levels of support for the continuation of economic reforms between men and women. However, that difference evaporates once we control for salary and *pocketbook* and *sociotropic* assessments in areas where market reforms have been implemented—Moscow and large cities.

Women who have succeeded economically speaking or perceive themselves as having done so, are no less supportive of market reform than their male counterparts. This suggests that the lack of support for reform among women reported in most research studies is an economic phenomenon. That is, as the salary gap between men and women closes, researchers should

measure a reduction in the gap in the support for reform between men and women. Overall these results indicate that women, as men, support market reform roughly in relation to how they have benefited, economically speaking, from the reform.

Furthermore, the persistence of a statistically significant relationship between *pocketbook* evaluation and salary, on one hand and support for reform on the other, argues against Duch's (1993; 1995) minimization of the importance of family economic circumstances on support for reform. If Russians were *sophisticated* in the late Soviet period in the sense that they were willing to endure economic dislocations accruing as a result of reform efforts, our findings indicate that only those who had benefited economically speaking were willing to do so a few short years following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Our findings argue against the existence of a Russian "gender gap" in terms of support for market reform. Some have argued that such a "gender gap" stems from women's greater dependence upon the state for maternity benefits, childcare, and other forms of assistance. However, if such were the case, even where the reforms have been implemented they would have generated less support among women than men. We argue otherwise. Our data do not indicate any difference in support for market reform between men and women at higher levels of income. Our findings argue instead that any gender gap in support for market reform is related to income. The major factor that has reduced women's support for market reform has been their salary disadvantage. If larger numbers of women oppose the reforms, they do so because larger numbers of women have not benefited from them. Those women who have benefited from the reforms are among its most ardent supporters, thus challenging the notion that women comprise a reservoir of support for social welfare policies. We would argue that women support such solutions only to the degree that they have been excluded from the market. They are no more apt to do so

for peculiarly gender-related reasons. This would seem to indicate that public policies aimed at removing barriers potential to upward mobility would have a significant, positive impact on women's public support for reform in Russia and close the gender gap in terms of support for market reform.

Table 1: Russian Economic Performance in the 1990s		
	% Growth in Prices	% Change in Real Gross Domestic Product (Russian Ruble)
1990-91	5.6%	-5.0%
1991-92	92.7%	-14.5%
1992-93	1,353.0%	-8.7%
1993-94	895.9%	-12.6%
1994-95	302.3%	-4.1%
1995-96	190.9%	-3.5%
1996-97	47.8%	+0.8%
1997-98	14.7%	-4.8%
1998-99	27.7%	-7.0%
1999-2000	20.8%	+0.03%
Source: The World Bank Group		

Variable Name	Definition	March 1994		March 2000	
		Men	Women	Men	Women
SR	Support for reform; Equal 1 if individual supports continuation of market reforms; Zero otherwise; the Proportion of respondents expressing support for the continuation of reforms by gender is reported in the right hand columns	35.0%	28.1%	44.1%	30.0%
Age	Age of individual in years; Average age by gender is reported in the right hand columns	41.7	42.8	42.8	45.5
No-HighSchool	No high school diploma; Equal 1 for individuals without high school diploma; Zero otherwise; the Proportion of respondents without a high school diploma or equivalent by gender is reported in the right hand columns	43.2%	34.2%	23.9%	28.0%
College	College Graduate; Equal 1 for college graduates; Zero otherwise; the Proportion of respondents with a college degree of equivalent by gender is reported in the right hand columns	10.4%	12.5%	10.8%	12.5%
Moscow	Equal 1 for Moscow residents; Zero otherwise; the Proportion of respondents living in Moscow by gender is reported in the right hand columns	5.5%	6.4%	5.7%	6.5%
St Petersburg	Equal 1 for St. Petersburg residents; Zero otherwise; the Proportion of respondents living in St. Petersburg by gender is reported in the right hand columns	3.4%	3.2%	3.3%	3.5%
BigCity	Equal 1 for big city residents outside of Moscow and St. Petersburg; Zero otherwise; the Proportion of respondents living in big cities by gender is reported in the right hand columns	26.8%	27.0%	28.6%	26.5%
SmallTown	Equal 1 for small town residents; Zero otherwise; the Proportion of respondents living in small towns by gender is reported in the right hand columns	38.4%	37.8%	36.0%	37.8%
Pocketbook	Equal 1 for those with negative personal economic circumstance; Zero otherwise; the Proportion of respondents with negative pocketbook evaluations by gender is reported in the right hand columns	43.0%	46.3%	51.6%	52.3%
Sociotropic	Equal 1 for those with negative assessment of Russian economy; Zero otherwise; the Proportion of respondents with negative sociotropic evaluations by gender is reported in the right hand columns	72.1%	65.7%	71.2%	71.2%
NotWorking	Equal 1 for those not working ; Zero otherwise;	28.2%	42.5%	38.3%	48.6%
Salary	Monthly salary in rubles at the time of the survey; Average montly salary by gender is reported in the right hand columns	115.0	57.2	977.0	441.3

Table 3: Percent who support market reform by assessed economic conditions and salary												
	All			Negative Pocketbook			Negative Sociotropic			Low Salary <sup>3</sup>		
	Men	Women	Ratio: Women/ Men	Men	Women	Ratio: Women/ Men	Men	Women	Ratio: Women /Men	Men	Women	Ratio: Women/ Men
1994	.401	.303	<b>.756</b>	.312	.233	<b>.747</b>	.367	.276	.752	.359	.285	<b>.794</b>
2000	.477	.350	<b>.734</b>	.370	.266	<b>.717</b>	.500	.370	.740	.424	.315	<b>.743</b>
Source: 1994 and 2000 March VCIOM Surveys												

---

<sup>3</sup>Low salary is defined as individual salary below the mean.

Table 4: Impact of factors on support for reform, 1994 and 2002


	1994		2000	
	Coefficient	t-value	Coefficient	t-value
Age	-0.0134 <sup>a</sup>	(-4.621)	-0.0196 <sup>a</sup>	(-6.579)
NoHighSchool	-0.5759 <sup>a</sup>	(-4.786)	-0.3099 <sup>a</sup>	(-1.980)
College	0.5199 <sup>a</sup>	(5.002)	0.4088 <sup>a</sup>	(3.654)
Moscow	0.6414 <sup>a</sup>	(3.592)	1.2298 <sup>a</sup>	(8.133)
St.Petersburg	0.3593	(1.516)	0.2534	(0.863)
BigCity	0.3780 <sup>a</sup>	(3.365)	0.7104 <sup>a</sup>	(5.173)
SmallTown	-0.0005	(-0.005)	0.6511 <sup>a</sup>	(4.978)
Pocketbook	-0.5606 <sup>a</sup>	(-4.980)	-0.5507 <sup>a</sup>	(-4.641)
Male*Pocketbook	-0.1306	(-0.745)	-0.1071	(-0.574)
Sociotropic	-0.3511 <sup>a</sup>	(-3.066)	0.2650 <sup>a</sup>	(1.965)
Male*Sociotropic	0.0343	(0.190)	0.1118	(0.539)
NotWorking	0.1580	(1.470)	0.0471	(0.420)
Salary	0.0006	(0.971)	0.0002 <sup>a</sup>	(2.891)
Male	0.4931 <sup>a</sup>	(2.894)	0.4826 <sup>a</sup>	(2.192)
Male*Salary	0.0001	(0.147)	-0.0001	(-1.350)
Constant	-0.1147	(-0.665)	-0.4679 <sup>a</sup>	(-2.228)
Number of observations	2958		2407	
Log-likelihood ( $\beta$ 's = 0)	-1901.0		-1619.2	
Log-likelihood (unrestricted)	-1755.9		-1441.2	
$\chi^2_{15,1}$	290.1		356.8	

<sup>a</sup>Coefficient is statistically significant at 95 percent level

Table 5: Factors affecting support for reform by residence, 2000

	Moscow	Big City	Small Town	Rural
Age	-0.0277 (-4.223)	-0.0270 (-4.766)	-0.0112 (-2.120)	-0.0148 (-1.779)
NoHighSchool	-0.1740 (-0.438)	-0.3123 (-0.864)	-0.3258 (-1.324)	-0.5101 (-1.376)
College	0.7962 (3.378)	0.2346 (1.144)	0.2849 (1.390)	0.6363 (1.882)
Pocketbook	-0.3352 (-1.232)	-0.5229 (-2.199)	-0.8547 (-4.110)	-0.3213 (-1.133)
Male*Pocketbook	-0.4755 (-1.058)	-0.0290 (-0.080)	0.4244 (1.322)	-0.7261 (-1.584)
Sociotropic	-0.0962 (-0.322)	0.6444 (2.312)	0.0726 (0.310)	0.3715 (1.121)
Male*Sociotropic	0.3227 (0.682)	0.0053 (0.013)	0.0904 (0.252)	-0.1709 (-0.326)
NotWorking	0.3502 (1.262)	0.1626 (0.709)	0.0133 (0.699)	-0.1281 (-0.467)
Salary	0.0004 (2.490)	0.0004 (2.279)	-0.00001 (-0.137)	0.0002 (1.011)
Male	0.5325 (1.076)	0.4931 (1.131)	0.1611 (0.420)	0.9991 (1.819)
Male*Salary	-0.0003 (-1.867)	-0.0002 (-1.228)	0.0001 (0.912)	0.0001 (0.250)
CONSTANT	0.9162 (1.973)	0.2026 (0.532)	0.2421 (0.727)	-0.8493 (-1.778)
n	429	600	763	549
Log-likelihood ( $\beta$ 's = 0)	-292.6	-410.3	-512.2	--301.7
Log-likelihood (unrestricted)	-260.6	-371.8	-482.7	-269.2
$\chi^2_{15,1}$	64.2	76.8	59.1	65.0

Figure 1: Ratio of women's to men's support for reform versus salary by residence



## References

- Baxter, Sandra and Marjorie Lansing. *Women and Politics: The Invisible Majority*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1980.
- Born, Richard. "Strategic Politicians and Unresponsive Voters." *American Political Science Review* 80 (1986): 599-612.
- Brainerd, Elizabeth. "Women in transition: Changes in gender wage differentials in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union." *Industrial & Labor Relations Review* 54.1 (2000): 138-162.
- Brym, Robert J. "Re-evaluating Mass Support for Political and Economic Change in Russia." *Europe-Asia Studies* 48 (1996): 751-766.
- Carnaghan, Ellen and Donna Bahry. "Political Attitudes and the Gender Gap in the USSR." *Comparative Politics* 22.4 (1990): 379-399.
- Clark, T.D., Ernest Goss and Larisa B. Kosova. "Economic Well-Being and Popular Support for Market Reform in Russia," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, April 2003, Vol. 51(3), pp. 754-768.
- Clark, T.D., Ernest Goss and Larisa B. Kosova. *Changing Attitudes toward Economic Reform during the Yeltsin Era*, Praeger Press, Westport, Connecticut, 2003.
- Cook, Fay L. *Who Should Be Helped?* Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1979.
- Duch, Raymond M. "Tolerating Economic Reform: Popular Support for Transition to a Free Market in the Former Soviet Union." *American Political Science Review* 87.3 (1993): 590-608.
- Duch, Raymond M. "Economic Chaos and the Fragility of Democratic Transition in Former Communist Regimes." *The Journal of Politics* 37.1 (1995): 121-158.
- Erikson, Robert S. "Economic Conditions and the Congressional Vote: A Review of the Macrolevel Evidence." *American Journal of Political Science* 34 (1990): 373-399.
- Erikson, Robert S. "Economic Conditions and the Presidential Vote." *American Political Science Review* 83 (1989): 567-573.
- Eulau, Heinz and Michael Lewis-Beck, eds. *Economic Conditions and Electoral Outcomes*. New York: Agathon, 1985.
- Finifter, Ada W. and Ellen Mickiewicz. "Redefining the Political System of the USSR: Mass Support for Political Change." *American Political Science Review* 86.4 (1992): 857-874.

Finifter, Ada L. "Attitudes toward Individual Responsibility and Political Reform in the Former Soviet Union." *American Political Science Review* 90 (1996): 138-152.

Fiorina, Morris P. "Economic Retrospective Voting in American National Elections: A Micro-Analysis." *American Journal of Political Science* 22 (1978): 426-443.

Fiorina, Morris P. *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981.

Fiorina, Morris P. "Who Is Held Responsible? Further Evidence on the Hibbing-Alford Thesis." *American Journal of Political Science* 27 (1983): 158-164.

Gaddy, C.G. and B.W. Ickes. "Getting realistic about Russia: No time for illusions," *The Brookings Review*; Winter 1999, Volume 17(1), pp. 44-48.

Hanson, Stephen E. "The Dilemmas of Russia's Anti-Revolutionary Revolution." *Current History* 100.648 (2001): 330-335.

Hibbing, John R. and John R. Alford. "The Electoral Impact of Economic Conditions: Who Is Held Responsible?" *American Journal of Political Science* 25 (1981): 423-439.

Hibbs, Douglas A., Jr. *The American Political Economy: Macroeconomics and Electoral Politics in the United States*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987.

Hibbs, Douglas A., Jr. "On the Demand for Economic Outcomes: Macroeconomic Performance and Mass Political Support in the United States, Great Britain, and Germany." *Journal of Politics* 44 (1982): 426-462.

Hibbs, Douglas A., Jr. "President Reagan's Mandate from the 1980 Elections: A Shift to the Right?" *American Politics Quarterly* 10 (1982): 387-420.

Hunter, Robert. J. "Current issues in Russian taxation." *The International Tax Journal* 25.2 (1999): 59-70.

Izyumov, Alexei and Irina Razumnova. "Women entrepreneurs in Russia: Learning to survive the market." *Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship* 5.1 (2000): 1-19.

Key, V.O., Jr. *The Responsible Electorate*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966.

Kiewiet, D. Roderick and Douglas Rivers. "A Retrospective on Retrospective Voting." *Political Behavior* 6 (1984): 369-393.

Kinder Donald R. and D. Roderick Kiewit. "Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgements on Congressional Voting." *American Journal of Political Science* 23 (1979): 495-517.

- Kosova, Larissa B. "Udovletvorennost' zhizn'iu I intensivnost' reform (Satisfaction with Life and the Intensity of the Reforms)." *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniie*, no. 10 (1994): 161-164.
- Kramer, Gerald. "Short-term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896-1964." *American Political Science Review* 64 (1971): 131-143.
- Kuklinski, James H. and Darrell M. West. "Economic Expectations and Voting Behavior in United States House and Senate Elections." *American Political Science Review* 75 (1981): 436-447.
- Lepper, Susan. "Voting Behavior and Aggregate Policy Targets." *Public Choice* 18 (1974): 67-82.
- Lewin, Moshe. *The Gorbachev Phenomenon: A Historical Interpretation*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988.
- Lewis-Beck, Michael S. "Comparative Economic Voting: Britain, France, Germany, and Italy." *American Journal of Political Science* 30 (1986): 315-346.
- Lewis-Beck, Michael S. *Economics and Elections: The Major Western Democracies*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1988.
- Lewis-Beck, Michael S. and Tom W. Rice. "Forecasting U.S. House Elections." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 9 (1984): 475-486.
- Lokshin, Michael, and Barry M. Popkin. "The emerging underclass in the Russian Federation: Income dynamics, 1992-1996." *Economic Development and Cultural Change*. 47.4 (1999): 803-829.
- MacKuen, Michael B., Robert S. Erikson, and James A. Stimson. "Peasants or Bankers? The American Electorate and the U.S. Economy." *American Political Science Review* 86 (1992): 597-611.
- Markus, Gregory B. "The Impact of Personal and National Economic Conditions on the Presidential Vote: A Pooled Cross-Sectional Analysis." *American Journal of Political Science* 32 (1988): 137-154.
- Mason, David S. "Attitudes toward the Market and Political Participation in the Postcommunist States." *Slavic Review* 54.2 (1995): 385-406.
- McFaul, Michael. "Putin in Power." *Current History* 99.639 (October 2000): 307-314.
- Miller, Arthur H., Vicki L. Hesli, and William M. Reisinger. "Reassessing Mass Support for Political and Economic Change in the Former Soviet Union." *American Political Science Review* 88.2 (1994): 399-411.

Miller, Arthur H. Vicki L. Hesli, and William M. Reisinger. "Comparing Citizen and Elite Belief Systems in Post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 59 (1995): 1-40.

Monroe, Kristen. *Presidential Popularity and the Economy*. New York: Praeger, 1984.

Offe, Claus. "Capitalism by Democratic Design? Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe." *Social Research* 58 (Winter 1991): 865-892.

Samarina, O. "The social protection of women and family policy in contemporary Russia." *Problems of Economic Transition* 44.1 (2001): 72-80.

Scott, John T., Richard E. Matland, Philip A. Michelbach, and Brian H. Bornstein. "Just Deserts: An Experimental Study of Distributive Justice Norms." *American Journal of Political Science* 45 (2001): 749-767.

Shapiro, Robert Y. and Harpreet Mahajan. "Gender Differences in Policy Preferences: A Summary of Trends from the 1960s to the 1980s." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 50 (1986): 42-61.

Puffer, S. M. and D. J. McCarthy. "Finding Common Ground in Russian and American Business Ethics." In S. M. Puffer (ed.). *Business and Management in Russia*. Brookfield: Edward Elgar, 1996.

Przeworski, Adam. *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Shevtsova, Lilia. "Yeltsin and the Evolution of Electoral Monarchy in Russia." *Current History* 99.639 (October 2000): 315-320.

Tufte, Edward R. "Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections." *American Political Science Review* 69 (1975): 812-826.

Tufte, Edward R. *Political Control of the Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.

Welch, Susan and John Hibbing. "Financial Considerations, Gender, and Voting in American National Elections." *Journal of Politics* 54 (1992): 197-213.